University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Theses and Major Papers

Marine Affairs

1994

The Evolving "Takings" Doctrine: The Supreme Court Poses a
Challenge for Coastal Zone Management
Catherine L. Chase
University of Rhode Island

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds
Part of the Legislation Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, and the
Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons

Recommended Citation
Chase, Catherine L., "The Evolving "Takings" Doctrine: The Supreme Court Poses a Challenge for Coastal
Zone Management" (1994). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 348.
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds/348

This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

The Evolving "Takings" Doctrine:
The Supreme Court poses
a challenge
for coastal zone management

by
Catherine L. Chase

A paper submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Marine Affairs

University of Rhode Island
1994

Major Paper
Master of Marine Affairs

Approved

0,e~ ) J.,--

Professor Dennis Nixon /

University of Rhode Island
1994

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my special thanks to Professor
Dennis Nixon for his support and encouragement
throughout my studies in the Marine Affairs Program.
I am also extremely grateful for the assistance of Ms.
Maggie Rauch and Mrs. Alice Juda of the Naval War
College Library, without whom a significant portion
of the research for this paper could not have been
accomplished.

Table of Contents

Synopsis

.

1

I. Land Management in the Coastal Zone

4

A . Land-Use Management . . .
1. The Early History . . . .
2 . The Emergence of Zoning .

4

B. Coastal Zone Management . .

9

C. The Coastal Zone Management Act

12

II . The Takings Doctrine . . . . . . .

15

4

6

A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission . . . . . . . . .
1. Facts in the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 . The Nature of Property and Takings
3. Views on the Essential Nexus Test .

15
15
19
24

B. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
1. Facts in the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Effect of Lucas on the Beachfront Management Act
3. Nuisance and Noxious Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Views on the Lucas Categorical Takings Test . . . . . .

32
33
38
41
47

C. Dolan v. City of Tigard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Facts in the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Dolan "Rough Proportionality" Test . . . . . . . .

57
58
62

III. Management Without Taking.
A. The Realm of Politics . . .
B. Coastal Management Within the Realm of Politics
1. Transfer of Development Rights and Existing-Use Zoning
2. "Thoughtful" Planning and Regulation
IV. Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72
72
77
78
81
86

SYNOPSIS

There is an increasingly powerful and vocal group coalescing in society today,
sometimes described as anti-environmentalists or Property Firsters', who feel that the
government has exceeded its authority in interfering with individual rights for the
purpose of protecting natural resources. The resurgence of this philosophy has often
been attributed to the "conservative renaissance of the Reagan years, "2 but the
movement appears to be gathering support even in the ostensibly more liberal political
atmosphere of the 1990s. Regardless of any personal convictions regarding this often
emotionally-charged issue, people involved in coastal management and planning
should be aware of the changes in legal doctrines which have come about as a result
of "property first" challenges to regulatory or zoning statutes.
These challenges have been pursued successfully in the courts by characterizing

'This group has also been characterized as the property rights movement or the pro-property movement.
University of Chicago law professor Richard Epstein has been a prominent voice for their efforts, and is
credited with the authorship of their "manifesto" (Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain, (1985». Kaplan and Cohn , Pay Me, or Get Off My Land, NEWSWEEK, 9
March 1992, at 70.

2Ibid. There is little doubt that President Reagan's policies were conservative, and it would seem that
his administration was not unaware of the potential regulatory pitfalls created by the legal trends of the late
1980's. This concern was demonstrated in the President's response to the Supreme Court's "temporary
taking" decision in First English Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U. S. 304 (1987).
President Reagan issued an executive order directing that the Justice Department to promulgate "Guidelines
for the Evaluation of Risk and Avoidance of Unanticipated Takings." Executive Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed.
Reg. 8,859 (1988), as quoted by Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I
-- A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1989). This order
dealt with limiting the possibility of incurring takings claims by limiting the regulations placed on land use,
a stance that was unreservedly hostile to environmental efforts.

1

state and local land use ordinances as a "taking" of private property under the Fifth
Amendment,' so it is vital for coastal managers to have the clearest possible
understanding of the basis of the challenges: the takings doctrine . In the course of
the past decade, this doctrine has been altered by several important U. S. Supreme
Court decisions which dealt with resolving a conflict between land use ordinances and
the property rights of private citizens. It seems, however, that most discussion of
these decisions has been confined to law review journals and to the debates regarding
strictly legal implications contained therein. Instead of focusing solely on the often
subtle and convoluted legal points of the takings decisions, this paper will provide an
analysis of the issue as it affects coastal management regulatory and zoning efforts.
In order to clearly establish this framework, Section I will briefly describe the
history of land-use management and the regulatory tools commonly used in the field
today. It will examine some of the issues and conflicts at work in the nation's coastal
areas, emphasizing the history of management efforts and providing a basis for
ensuing discussion. Section II will provide a description of the takings issue and a
synopsis of the current state of the takings doctrine in light of three influential
Supreme Court decisions regarding takings by environmental regulations. This
description will present the major points of the legal theories behind takings

3The takings clause of the U. S. Constitution states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use without just compensation." U. S. CONST., amend. V, and this clause is applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166
U. S. 226 (1897) in which the Court held that there was "a condition precedent to the exercise of the power
of eminent domain that the statute make provision for reasonable compensation to the owner," quoted by
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1630, 1660 (1988).
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jurisprudence, with the goal of developing a better understanding of the interactions of
judicial and regulatory efforts. Section III will discuss the origins and implications of
the recent changes in the takings doctrine and will focus on potential strategies for
continuing ecologically sound practices while minimizing takings challenges.
Drawing on this background , it will discuss possible methods of regulation which do
not violate established legal limits, concentrating on the role of coastal managers in
the further development of takings doctrine.

3

I. LAND MANAGEMENT IN THE COASTAL ZONE

A. Land-Use Management
Conflicting ideas about the proper role of land-use regulation and the extent of an
owner's autonomy in determining the appropriate uses of property lie at the root of
the property rights controversy. These types of conflicts are not new, nor are they
strictly a product of the rapidly changing society of the twentieth century. The basic
definition of property, and of an owner's rights with regard to its use, have been
constantly transformed throughout history. The concept of property rights in America
today has its origins in the ancient laws of England, but it is indisputable that the
problems of modern society have required extensive alterations to traditional values.

1. The Early History
The dawn of our current era of land proprietorship, or private ownership,
occurred in the thirteenth century when the older concept of feudal land tenure began
to be replaced with freehold ownership of land in towns and cities. 4 Eventually, the
private ownership of land came to be considered a fundamental right of the citizenry.
Legal scholars recognized the importance and power behind this concept:
"There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination,
and engages the affections of mankind as the right of property; or
that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in exclusion of the rights of

4RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE CONTROL: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 51 (1991).

4

any other individual in the Universe. "5
This right to own the land absolutely, and to pass it on to designated heirs, is still one
of the most fundamental and jealously guarded rights in our society.
Nevertheless, even thirteenth century landowners were not completely autonomous
in the use of their property. When land uses brought law-abiding people into conflict
with one another, their disputes were often settled by judicial authorities, and these
settlements were incorporated into the English common law.6 One of the most
important tenets of the common law was the doctrine of nuisance, which provided
both a protection for property owners and a limitation of their rights. This venerable
doctrine has recently assumed a new level of importance for land-use management,
and it will be examined in greater detail in Section II. For the moment, however, it
is sufficient to understand that property owners have traditionally been enjoined not to
use their land in ways that were harmful to neighbors or to society at large. 7
These traditions of property ownership and common law moved across the
Atlantic with the English settlers of the American colonies, and their strength in the
New World was evident in the constitutional protections given to property when those

5WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, SECOND BOOK
1 (1768/1863), quoted by PLAIT, supra note 4, 52.
6An understanding of the nature of the common law has become increasingly important for land-use
regulators and managers. Platt describes it succinctly as consisting of "the accumulated wisdom of courts
faced with specific disputes in which they invoke principles of law, drawn from earlier decisions and other
sources, as a basis for decision." PLATT, supra note 4, 52.

"Typical forms of uses that created a nuisance were : blocking off light and air, creating bad odors or
other types of air pollution, loud continuous noises, and "other externalities that impair the quiet enjoyment
of nearby property." PLAIT, supra note 4, 53.
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colonies became a nation. 8 The development and settlement of the North American
continent required people with a sense of independence and fierce individualism, and
these qualities were reflected in the evolution of the new nation's property laws. As
one author put it, "the nation was built by private initiatives on privately held land.
The American land ethic grew as an ethic of owner autonomy and change. "9
It was not until the industrialization of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that
comprehensive land-use management began to become a necessity. By that time,
growing urban populations and new technologies made it imperative to develop some
method of centralized control over property uses. The methods still in use today
grew out of attempts to solve problems as they arose, and the current practice of landuse regulation has been described as "a fascinating mixture of administrative,
constitutional, local government, and property law'"? that "often mirror[s] the clash
of values in modern American society. "11

2. The Emergence of Zoning
Although other restrictions on the use of property exist, the practice of zoning

8See discussion of the Fifth Amendment and the takings clause, supra note 3. Additional protections
were given to property under the Third (prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in private homes without
owners' permission) and Fourth (making explicit the right of citizens to be secure in their houses)
Amendments. U. S. CONST., amend. III and IV, quoted by Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74
MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989).
"H umbach, supra note 8, 340.
'OPETER W. SALSICH, JR., LAND USE REGULATION: PLANNING, ZONING, SUBDIVISION
REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL xi (1991).

"Ibid.
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has dominated twentieth century land-use planning and management in this country.
Originally practiced in Germany, 12 zoning was enthusiastically adopted in America,
becoming a quintessentially American institution with the blend of idealism and
II

greed that that implies. 1113 At the time of its introduction, zoning was met with some
resistance, as is usually the case with new ideas. In keeping with the requirements of
American government, the dispute over the constitutional validity of zoning was
settled by the Supreme Court. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 14 the
Court upheld the power of a local government to restrict property uses under a zoning
scheme, even though the restrictions had severe adverse impacts on the market value
of some property. The method of land-use regulation which was legitimized by this
decision came to be referred to as Euclidian zoning. 15
It is not the intention of this discussion to provide a detailed analysis of the

practice of zoning, and such descriptions have been more than adequately provided by
other authors." Nonetheless, it is necessary for land-use managers, including
coastal mangers, to have a basic understanding of how the method works, its uses,
and its effect on regulatory efforts. The Court's legal rationale for allowing the

'2SALSICH, supra note 10, 125.
13pLATT, supra note 4, 165.
14 272 U. S. 365 (1926), cited in Comment: Is There a Doctrine in the House?: The Nuisance
Exception to the Takings Clause Has Been Mortally Wounded By Lucas, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1304
(authored by Andrew R. Mylott).
15pLATT, supra note 4, 165.
16See, for example, DUDLEY S. HINDS, NEIL G. CARN, and O. NICHOLAS ORDWAY, WINNING
AT ZONING (1979).
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constitutionality of zoning was that the practice was simply an extension of the
common law of nuisance, 17 one "with the great advantage ... of providing all
landowners with knowledge before the fact of what they could and could not do with
their land. "18 The power of local governments to enact zoning regulations was
derived from the police power'? of the state, and therefore state enabling legislation
was necessary in order for zoning to be implemented."
Once the enabling legislation was in place, local governments could plan our"
and control the use of property within their jurisdiction. The mechanism for this
control was two-part: 1) a zoning map was developed, clearly indicating the affected
areas and their boundaries; and 2) zoning ordinances were drafted, containing
information on the allowable uses of the areas shown on the map. There are
numerous types of zoning ordinances, some of which deal with the density of
development allowed, others which dictate the authorized uses of an area
(agricultural, residential, commercial, etc.), and still others which have more specific

17"The Court granted broad deference to legislative determinations by allowing local authorities to
restrict building rights according to the general location of a particular property. In doing so, the Court
likened building in violation of zoning regulations to committing a nuisance, [saying] 'A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place , -- like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. '" Mylott, supra
note 14, 1304-1305, quoting Euclid, supra note 14, at 338.
18RlCHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 4 (1966) .
19The police power of the state (ie. the government) has been summarized as the "term given to the
general governmental power to protect the health, safety, morals , and general welfare of its citizenry."
SALSICH, supra note 10, 3.

2°Ibid., 127.
211t is axiomatic that zoning requirements must advance and be in accordance with a "comprehensive
plan." PLAIT, supra note 4, 201. In fact, Babcock mockingly refers to the "Planner's Oath: 'Zoning is
merely a tool of planning.'" BABCOCK, supra note 18, 120.
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restrictions such as historic preservation rules. An area can be affected by more than
one type of zoning ordinance, and the combinations can become quite complicated."
These types of traditional zoning regulations tend to be somewhat rigid and
cumbersome, and efforts to allow the zoning ordinances to evolve with time have
introduced ever more complex schemes into the equation. These more complex types
of zoning techniques have come to be known collectively as flexible zoning."
Because flexible zoning techniques were designed to allow for changing or special
circumstances in an area , they can be extremely useful for coastal managers who must
deal with an extraordinary, and often-changing, physical environment. By their
nature, flexible zoning techniques involve innovation, and so they are subject to the
disadvantages of the challenges and controversies that surround new ideas.
Nevertheless, flexible zoning may offer useful solutions to the unique problems of the
coastal zone. The issues and laws involved in coastal management differ somewhat
from non-coastal urban planning, and so deserve further attention.

B. Coastal Zone Management
"The basic issue in the coastal zone is the management of growth to meet multiple
objectives. "24 The apparent simplicity of this assertion masks a myriad of constantly

22DUDLEY S. HINDS, NEIL G. CARN, and O. NICHOLAS ORDWAY, supra note 16, chap. 1 & 5
passim .
23

Ibid. , 98-99 .

24MICHAEL S. BARUM, TIMOTHY BACKSTROM, and BRADLEY SCHRADER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SITING OF FACILITIES: ISSUES IN LAND USE AND
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT Il9 (1976), hereinafter BARUM.

9

changing and often formidable problems which arise when these management
objectives conflict with one another. As society grows more complex and population
pressures increase, the likelihood of conflict among landowners and other interest
groups increases as well. Yet our dependence on the nation's coasts as an area of
residence and productivity has not declined with the advance of technology, but rather
is steadily growing ."
The idea of controlling and regulating activities along a nation's coasts and in the
adjacent areas is not new. The need for regulation was recognized as early as the
sixth century when the governing authorities of the time saw the necessity of
codifying citizens ' right to make certain use of these areas. Although these early laws
have been significantly altered by the passage of centuries, the basic concepts have
survived in the Public Trust Doctrine" and have helped to shape modem law
governing coastal zone management efforts.
The field of Coastal Zone Management as a distinct discipline , however, began
only recently, in the second half of the twentieth century. The late 1960s and early
1970s were years of increasing environmental awareness in the United States as the

25It is estimated that approximately 54 percent of the total population of the United States lives in the
coastal zone. Current figures also indicate that 33 to 50 percent of nation's jobs and one-third of the GNP
originates in coastal areas. In spite of this dependence on the region, government officials and
environmentalists agree that the coastal ecosystems around the nation present an "overpowering problem."
Martello, Saving Coastal Areas Through Partnerships, 35 SEA TECHNOLOGY 65, 65-66 (September
1994).
26The Public Trust Doctrine provides that title to tidal and navigable freshwaters, the lands beneath
these waters, and the living resources inhabiting them is held by the state in trust for the benefit of the
public. It establishes the public's right to use these areas for a variety of purposes. MOLLY SELVIN,
THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS - THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789-1920 1-3 (1987).
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devastation wrought by years of uncontrolled industrial and developmental activities
began to be apparent. 27 Incidents of catastrophic pollution such as oil spills helped
to establish public support for environmental regulation. As one author put it, "The
long-tolerated destruction of our environmental inheritance ... finally produced a
social reaction. " 28
Measures designed to deal with this problem included environmental policy
legislation, land-use controls, and state constitutional provisions guaranteeing citizens'
right to environmental quality. 29 Environmental land-use controls were often
justified by efforts to quantify the social costs of environmental degradation, but such
efforts aroused enormous controversy. The argument about the existence of
environmental "externalities, "30 and about the proper methods for dealing with them
if they do exist (as something other than a clever, pseudo-scientific justification for
shifting the costs of a cleaner ecosystem onto the hapless business community),
remains one of the bitterest disputes in the environmental arena today.
Nonetheless, numerous laws were enacted during the years which have been

27The awareness of these issues was heightened by the publication of numerous books cataloging the
environmental woes facing the nation and the world. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) is credited with
having "ignited the environmental movement." PLATT, supra note 4, 300. This work was augmented by
numerous others of a similar theme. See Platt, 300-301 for a listing of the more effective publications on
this topic.
28DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE 1
(1981).

291bid.

"Economists define externalities as "the side-effects of an action that influence the well-being of
nonconsenting parties." Externalities may be either beneficial or harmful. JAMES D. GWARTNEY AND
RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 86, 6th ed., (1992) .
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dubbed the "Federal Environmental Decade, "31 with the aim of preventing further
damage to the earth's resources. Some of the most important and enduring of these
laws include the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Air Act, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), and the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA). The focus of much of this legislation was on the clean-up
and prevention of pollution, but the designers of these laws also recognized the need
to establish a basis for controlling environmentally harmful actions in the future. The
Coastal Zone Management Act in particular provided a framework for constructive
future planning efforts."

C. The Coastal Zone Management Act

Originally enacted in 1972 and reauthorized (and amended) in 1990, the CZMA is
the legislation which currently guides national efforts at coastal management. The
basic national policy outlined by the Act, to "preserve, protect, develop, and where
possible to restore or enhance'i" coastal resources, has often been regarded as
contradictory in nature. This statement of policy, however, is also an
acknowledgement of the often conflicting demands placed on those who oversee the
J1pLATT, supra note 4, 299. "The new environmental laws of the 1970's did not merely refine the
conservation measures of the 1960's. They enlarged both the range of problems addressed through federal
programs and the spectrum of means by which such problems were to be attacked... the federal role
shifted from a timid reliance on state programs to direct setting and enforcement of national standards." Id.
J2See BARUM, supra note 24, at 121-127, for a complete discussion of the various environmental
legislation passed during this period. The Coastal Zone Management Act, hereinafter CZMA, expressed
lawmakers' intention to promote sustainable development in the nation's coastal zone and acts as a guide
for state government efforts in this area. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,16 U. S. C. 1451 et seq.
JJCoasta1 Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. 1451, sect 303(1).
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management of coastal areas. While it is clearly impossible to develop and preserve
the same discrete location, the CZMA calls on the good judgement of administrators
to determine which of the options is most desirable in various areas. Unfortunately ,
it is not always possible to divide conflicting uses into separate areas, and it is in such
circumstances that managers must try to balance the demands of diverse users in the
coastal zone.
Decisions regarding local use, preservation, or development of coastal lands are
usually best made at as near a local level as possible. The CZMA recognized this
principle and employed various incentives to encourage each coastal state to develop
an individual plan for the coastal zone.34 This structure gave the resulting national
effort great versatility by allowing each state government to craft a management plan
which was appropriate for the geography, economy, and political landscape of the
area. As is the case with all such forward-looking legislation, the Constitution itself
being no exception, the framework provided could not suffice to solve all the
problems encountered over time.
Only a decade after the passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act, scientists
and administrators working to implement the newly-established Coastal Zone
Management Plans were faced with problems that had not been fully anticipated .
These coastal managers, along with state and federal legislators and eventually the
judiciary, began to struggle with complex questions such as the extent (if any) of state

34Ibid. , sect. 306. The term "coastal zone," as defined by the CZMA, includes the coastal
waters and the adjacent shorelands, with the landward boundary extending "inland from the
shorelines only to the extent necessary to control shore lands, the uses of which have a direct and
significant impact on the coastal waters." Ibid., sect. 304(1).
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coastal zone management authority over continental shelf oil and gas leasing and the
need for coordination of management plans in areas such as the Chesapeake Bay
(which fell under multiple jurisdictions). 35 The problem of coastal management
impacts on riparian landowners' rights, especially those in barrier beach and island
areas, began to emerge and was discussed in some detail at a conference of coastal
managers held in June 1982. 36 Concerns that conflict in this area might pose a
significant problem proved to be valid in the years that followed.

J5It is indicative of the type of organizational gridlock that can affect coastal management
efforts that this problem has still not been solved as 1994 draws to a close . It was not until July of
this year that any formal agreement to "manage the Chesapeake Bay watershed as a cohesive
whole" was developed. Now that management entities have agreed to work together, the success
of such a unilateral approach remains to be seen. Graham , Integrating Coastal Managem ent, 35
SEA TECHNOLOGY 7, (September 1994).
36THOMAS D. GALLOW AY, ed., THE NEWEST FEDERALISM: A NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR COASTAL ISSUES 194-214 (1982) .
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II - THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE

A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

The closely related issues of when government regulation constitutes a taking of
private property and of determining what comprises just compensation for such a
taking have long been contentious ones ." In the 1987 term, the Supreme Court
handed down four decisions which significantly impacted the takings doctrine. 38
Although the decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los

Angeles would have increasing importance in future years, it was Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission that had a direct, immediate effect on coastal management
efforts.

1. Facts in the Case
The incident which precipitated this case seems fairly straightforward and simple.
James and Marilyn Nollan leased a beachfront lot containing a small bungalow in

370ne analyst evaluating the status of the Supreme Court's takings doctrine has commented that
"it is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray," and has
described it as being "in chaos." Peterson, supra note 2, at 1303-4. Other scholars have leapt into
the takings fray , on one side or the other, and have cited longstanding controversy on the topic , see
Notes: Taking Back Takings: A Coasean Approach to Regulation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 914, 920
(1993).

38Nollan v. California Coastal Commission , 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County oj Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), hereinafter First English ;
Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,
107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
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Ventura County, California with an option to buy the property. This option to
purchase the lot was conditional, however, and required that the Nollans demolish and
replace the existing bungalow. This simple real estate transaction was transformed
into a complex legal problem when the couple sought a permit from the California
Coastal Commission to build a three-bedroom house on the property. The request
was approved, but the permit contained a provision requiring that the Nollans grant
the public an easement across their property. 39 Since it was the property owners '
persistent objections to this requirement that brought the case to the Supreme Court, it
is worthwhile to examine the details of the contested easement and the Commission's
motivations in requiring it.
This easement consisted of allowing the public lateral access to the beach portion
of the property. A description of the Nollan ' s lot was provided by Justice Scalia in
his opinion for the Court and this description sheds some light on the intentions of the
Commission. There was a public beach area in the immediate vicinity on either side
of the property, and the beachfront portion of the lot was separated from the
remainder by an eight foot high seawall." It seems clear that the Commission was

"Under California law, beachfront property owners were requ ired to obtain a coastal
development permit from the California Coastal Commission before undertaking a project of this
sort. The easement condition imposed on the Nollans was not unusual since the California Coastal
Act of 1976 authorized the Commission to impose public-access conditions on this sort of permit.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3143-3145.
4°The Faria County Park, a public recreation area and beach, was located a quarter of a mile
north of the Nollan's property, and another public beach was located 1,800 feet south of their lot.
Ibid., 3143.
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attempting to ensure that the new, and significantly larger," house on this site did
not in any way interfere with public use of the beaches to either side of the property
(or below the mean high tide mark which was the boundary of the private lot).
Members of the public were to be granted access to "pass and repass"? along the
sand between the seawall and the mean high tide mark." The specific requirement
for a deed condition containing this easement is made more understandable when the
description of the property is expanded to include the fact that "the high-tide line
shifts throughout the year, moving up to and beyond the seawall, so that public
passage for a portion of the year would either be impossible or would not occur on
appellant's property. "44 Given this type of physical environment along the
beachfront, it was logical for the Commission to take steps to ensure that the
increased development would not result in a barrier to public transit of the area.
Since the Commission's purpose in requiring the easement was legitimate and
understandable, what was it about the permit provision that was so contentious as to

41The Nollans' coastal development permit allowed them to replace a 521-square-foot structure
with a two-story, 1,674-square-foot house and attached two car garage (for a total development
covering 2,464 square feet). Ibid., 3158 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).
42The right to pass and repass is defined under California law as "the right to walk and run
along the shoreline," and this type of public access was deemed appropriate under circumstances
such as those found on the Nollan's property. Ibid., 3158 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).
431n one of the dissenting opinions in this case, Justice Brennan pointed out that "The deed
restriction was crafted to deal with the particular character of the beach along which appellants
sought to build, and with the specific problems created by expansion of development toward the
public tidelands.... The State sought to ensure that such development would not disrupt the
historical expectation of the public regarding access to the sea ." Ibid., 3141, 3156 (Justice
Brennan, dissenting).

"Ibid., 3157 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).
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require the decision of the nation's highest judicial authority to resolve? Was the
method used to obtain the easement somehow extraordinary, and so capable of
generating such fierce opposition from the Nollans? Both Justice Scalia, in the
majority opinion, and Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, acknowledged that this was
not the case." In fact, the Commission had been requiring lateral access easements
from beachfront developers for years before the Nollans brought their case to court.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the ruling of the California Court of
Appeal, deciding that the permit condition constituted a taking of the Nollans'
property without just compensation. 46 That this decision was a sharp blow to the
California Coastal Commission is certain, and it had significant implications for landuse regulators across the nation. Policies which had served adequately for years to
balance public and private needs were suddenly called into question and made
vulnerable to takings challenges. Justice Brennan no doubt summed up the feelings of
many when he stated that:

"The Court has thus struck down the Commission's reasonable
effort to respond to intensified development along the California
coast, on behalf of landowners who can make no claim that their
reasonable expectations have been disrupted. The Court has, in

Justice Brennan makes the point that "The specific deed restriction to which the Commission
sought to subject [the Nollans] had been imposed since 1979 on all 43 shoreline new development
projects [in the area]." Ibid., 3160; Justice Scalia acknowledges that the Nollans "acquired the land
well after the Commission had begun to implement its policy [of conditioning building permits on
the granting of easements]." Ibid.,3147.
45

"In his strongly-worded conclusion to the majority opinion in this case, Justice Scalia declares
that "California is free to advance its 'comprehensive program,' [of providing public beach access]
if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this 'public purpose,' but if it wants an
easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it." Ibid., 3151.
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short, given [the Nollans] a windfall at the expense of the
public. "47

Nonetheless, those people who must continue efforts to effectively manage
development in the coastal zone should understand the broader implications of the
issues decided in Nollan.

2. The Nature of Property and of Takings

Much of the discussion regarding this case, both in the Justices' opinions and in
subsequent reviews and articles, involves the attempt to define exactly what
constitutes a taking of private property by the government. By necessity, this
discussion requires a definition of the term "property," but there is general
disagreement as to the importance of isolating the Court's precise meaning when
using this term. 48 Although some would argue that the definition of property is of
minimal importance, at least in No/lan,49 anyone striving to understand the

"Ibid., 3151 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).
"Peterson considers pinning down an exact definition as critical and devotes a large segment of
her extensive work on the Court's underlying principles regarding the takings doctrine to an indepth discussion of the term "property" and the evolution of its meaning, noting that "In recent
takings decisions, the Court has defined 'property' in different and conflicting ways without even
acknowledging the inconsistencies in its definition, much less trying to resolve them. Peterson,
supra note 2, 1304. On the other hand, Douglas Kmiec considers the lack of a static definition of
property to be inherent in the system, and states that "fixing upon a conception of property that
gets the distinction between harm and benefit ... consistent with the constitutional aim of
insulating individual citizens from arbitrary or disproportionately burdensome exercises of
governmental power ... should be the main task of every taking case." Kmiec, supra note 3,
1640.
49 As one author put it, "There may be 'fundamental attributes of ownership' that government
cannot take without paying just compensation, but the right to develop land is not one of them."
Humbach, supra note 8, 351 (cites omitted).

19

implications of this decision should be familiar with the common concepts of
"property" which are referred to in the discussion.
Leaving aside any detailed analysis of the nature of property under the
Constitution, it is sufficient to understand that the Supreme Court has often utilized
the metaphor of property as a "bundle" of "strands" or "sticks. "50 Given the
complex nature of private property rights, this metaphor serves to illustrate how a
taking can occur when the deprivation of property involves an action other than an
outright, physical transfer of custody. A bundle of property rights might include such
diverse sticks as the right to build a structure, the right to extract minerals , or the
right to graze cattle . A taking of property may therefore involve only one stick in the
property owner's bundle of rights, provided that the stick in question is a separate and
identifiable property interest. 51
The next logical area of examination is the question of how the required easement
across the Nollan's property constituted a taking of one of their property sticks. In
order to decide this question, the Court set forth a chain of reasoning that is
unfamiliar and seems quite long and winding to a person not trained in the law. This

50Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 , citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp ., 458
U. S. 419,433 (1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979).

51For instance, the Court held in Nollan that the appellants had been deprived of property,
saying that "as to property reserved by its owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others is]
one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.' '' Ibid. On the other end of the spectrum, the Court found that no taking had occurred
in the case of a mining company seeking compensation for a state law which barred them from
removing a portion of the existing coal on their property (Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
Dellenedicits, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987)). In this case, the Court refused to consider the right to
mine the portion of coal that remained in place "as distinct property rights, observing that it has
consistently held that when an owner has a full bundle of rights , the destruction of one strand is
not a taking." Callies, Takings Claus e--Take Three , 73 A.B.A. J. 48, 52 (1987).
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chain proceeds as follows. When the Nollans acquired their property, they acquired a
bundle of rights which included the right to exclude other people from that
property. 52 Therefore, the required easement across their section of the beach
deprived the owners of a part of their property bundle. The fact that the state
required an easement as a condition for the issuance of a land-use permit did not
make the easement any less a withholding of the Nollans' stick of exclusion than
requiring the easement outright would have done. 53 In addition, the easement was
considered by the Court to be a "permanent physical occupation, "54 and such an
occupation is perhaps the most clear-cut instance of governmental action that is
considered to be a taking. 55 This being the case, it seems that the chain of reasoning
should end here with the simple conclusion that the easement requirement was a
taking of private property, but the issue becomes more complex.
The takings doctrine is a somewhat muddled area of the law. The confusion is
attributable to the many variables involved in takings cases and the ambiguous nature
of the concepts involved. Described as an "uneasy effort to reconcile government

52This is the interpretation of their rights as set forth by Justice Scalia in the majority opinion.

Nol/an, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145. Justice Brennan espouses the opposite view in his dissenting opinion,
stating that "California . .. has clearly established that the power of exclusion for which appellants seek
compensation simply is not a strand in the bundle of appellants' property rights, and appellants
have never acted as if it were." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141,3159 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).

53Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141,3147-48.
54The Court stated, "We think a 'permanent physical occupation' has occurred, ... where
individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property
may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself
permanently upon the premises." Ibid. , 3146.

"Peterson, supra note 2, 1310.
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power and individual liberty as encapsulated in the concept of private property , "56
the takings doctrine encompasses a series of rules riddled with exceptions .57 One
such exception emerges as a possibility in the Nollan's case, and dealing with it adds
a twist to the chain of reasoning . This exception hinges on the difference between
governmental action which constitutes a taking of private property because it is useful
to the public (under the power of eminent domain), and governmental action which
constitutes a taking, but which may not be compensable because it prevents some
detriment to the public interest (as an exercise of the police power)."
It is at this point that the Nollan Court makes pivotal decisions on two issues that

are of prime importance to coastal management efforts . The Court stated that an
easement requirement (or a similar type of land-use restriction) like that imposed on
the Nollans would be considered a taking, except in cases where the requirement for
the easement "'substantially advances[s] legitimate state interests' and 'does not den[y]

S6Kmiec, supra note 3, 1630.
S70ne author summarized this state of affairs rather eloquently when he said , "No single theory
has yet emerged which can serve as a comprehensive, universally applicable approach to resolving
takings disputes. The Supreme Court often resolves difficult issues of constitutional law by
establishing amorphous concepts and slippery tests, at least pretending that reasonable persons will
be able to apply [them] uniformly and correctly. The takings question has evoked a rare judicial
confession of inability to devise an appropriate test." Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The
National Flood Insurance Program and the 'Takings ' Clause, 17 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.

323, 338-9 (1990).

S8Ibid., 338. The "police power" of a state has been defined as "the inherent power of a
government to promote the public health, safety, or general welfare." Cook, Casenote: Lucas v.

South Carolina Coastal Council: Low Tide for the Takings Clause, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1433,
1439 (1993).
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an owner economically viable use of his land.' 1159 The first question for the Court
was then: was the requirement for an easement granting lateral access to the Nollan's
property a legitimate exercise of the state's police power that would escape being
classified as a compensable taking?60
In answering this question, the Court's reasoning is crucial to the success of future
management efforts similar to the one in contention. The Court took no stance in

Nollan as to exactly what constitutes a legitimate state interest, but instead accepted as
such the Commission's purposes in requiring the easement. These purposes included
"protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the
'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and
preventing congestion on the public beaches. 1161 Since these purposes were
legitimate, restricting the Nollans' use of their land would be an exercise of police
power, and the Court went so far as to say that the Commission would be authorized
to refuse the Nollans' permit request altogerher .f

59Nol/an, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147, quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255,260 (1980) and
citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127 (1978).

wrhere is one other possible avenue for arguing that the easement requirement was not a
taking of private property, and Peterson summarized it succinctly by saying: "However, when the
NoJlans bought their land, state law already provided that they would have to give up an easement
if they wished to build. Thus, ... one could argue that no property was taken .. ." Peterson,
supra note 2, 1335-6. Justice Brennan raises just this argument in his dissenting opinion (Nol/an,
107 S. Ct. 3141, 3159-60 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).), but Justice Scalia's opinion gives short
shrift to this point in a footnote (Nol/an, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147).
61

Ibid., 3148.

62" • • • the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their permit outright
if their new house (alone, or by reason of the cumulative impact produced in conjunction with
other construction) would substantially impede these purposes, unless their denial would interfere
so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taking." Ibid., 3148 .
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Therefore, the Court's analysis indicated that the Nollans would not have been
entitled to compensation if the Commission had refused to issue them a permit
altogether. Based on this assumption, the Court addressed the second pivotal
question: would a permit condition that served the same legitimate police-power
purpose as a simple refusal to issue that permit be considered a taking when the
refusal itself would not? The Court answered that this type of permit condition would
not be a taking." but then qualified their straightforward answer with one of the
"slippery tests"64 which are so common in takings decisions. This addition to the
array of tests for determining the existence of a taking is one that should be given
careful consideration by coastal managers .

3. Views On The Essential-Nexus Test
The new takings test devised in the Court's Nollan opinion basically states that
where a permit condition is imposed on a landowner for the purpose of furthering
some legitimate state interest, there must be an "essential nexus" between that purpose
and the stipulations of the permit condition." If this essential nexus cannot be

63Justice Scalia elaborates this point, saying ".. . if the Commission attached to the permit
some condition that would have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding
construction of the new house . .. so long as the Commission could have exerci sed its police
power ... to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be
constitutional." Ibid., 3148 .
64Singer, supra note 57, 338.
651n explaining the reasoning behind the need for such a test, the Court states that ". ..
constitutional propriety [of the permit condition substituted for a denial of the permit] disappears,
however if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as
the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situat~on bec~mes
the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensatIOns
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demonstrated, then the permit condition amounts to a taking of private property for
which the owner must be compensated. The reaction to the announcement of the
essential nexus test was somewhat mixed. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion (in
which he was joined by Justice Marshall) left no doubt as to the deep dissatisfaction
with which some members of the Court viewed this test. He stated that "the Court
employs its unduly restrictive standard of police power rationality to find a taking
where neither the character of governmental action nor the nature of the private
interest affected raise any takings concern. "66 In his separate dissenting opinion,
Justice Blackmun also took the position that the essential nexus requirement was too
narrow. 67
The controversy about this test was not limited to the Court or to the question of
whether there was a sound legal basis to support the nexus requirement. In fact, a
highly significant flaw to the essential nexus test, at least from a managerial
standpoint, was demonstrated by the widely varied interpretations of its meaning that
have been expressed since it was announced. Some analysts summed up the Nollan
test by concluding that the "Court appears to have given its collective blessing to
impact fees, dedications, exactions, and other conditions on land development. "68

to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury." Nollan , 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148.

lbid., 3161 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).

66

67"The close nexus between benefits and burdens that the Court now imposes on permit
conditions creates an anomaly in the ordinary requirement that a State's exercise of its police
power need be no more than rationally based." Ibid., 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3163 (Justice Blackmun,
dissenting).
68Callies, supra note 51, 52.
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Yet even this optimistic view was tempered by the consideration that ". . . 'traditional
dedication and exaction requirements long presumed legal, such as public roads and
parks ... may have to pass scrutiny under the Court's 'essential nexus' test, and
some may fail. "69
Another view of the Nollan decision held that the impact of the essential nexus
test itself was less important for the takings doctrine than the Court's return to the
consideration of "fairness" in takings cases that the decision signalled. 70 Adherents
of this theory regarded the careful formulation of the test found in Justice Scalia's
writing to be little more than judicial word-play designed to present the facts in such a
way that it was possible to justify arriving at the desired "fair" decision. If this were
the case, land-use managers need not concern themselves with puzzling out the
established takings doctrine when attempting to forecast whether or not a particular
regulatory effort will be considered a taking. Instead, they must analyze the impacts
of the regulation in terms of fairness to the landowners since, ". . . the Court decided
Nollan in a manner that is consistent with the analysis one might expect if one were
to consider the case in terms of societal notions of fairness, without regard to the

69/bid., 54.
"Professor Peterson uses the Nollan decision to demonstrate her theory that although much
effort has been expended in order to explicate the principles of the Court's takings doctrine, the
actual doctrine is so tangled and complex that it is of little use in predicting when the Court will
find that a taking has occurred. She posits, however, that such predictions can be accurately made
by looking at whether intended government action is fair to the landowner, citing as support the
Court's opinion in Armstrong v. United Stat es, 364 U. S. 4049 (1960) which asserted that the
takings clause was "... designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Peterson, supra note 2, 1304.
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Court's elaborate takings doctrine." Given the highly subjective nature of the term
"fairness," this is not a helpful management strategy.
A more moderate version of this theory allows for both the validity of the
essential nexus test and the consideration of fairness. Without throwing away the
Court's established doctrine in takings cases, another author espouses the idea that the
essential nexus test should in fact be expanded to include a consideration of whether
or not landowners are being asked to bear the burden of remedying a problem for
which they are not solely or directly to blame." If this is so, then in order to
predict when a land-use restriction will be considered a taking, a manager must
examine the intent of the government action. Using this method of analysis, it is
necessary "to draw a distinction between the use of the police power to prevent harms
as opposed to its use to extract benefits, a distinction central to the nuisance exception
to the just compensation requirement [in which land-use restriction is not considered a
taking]. "73
Other interpretations of the exact meaning and utility of the essential nexus test
were numerous. In February of 1988, a conference was held at Dartmouth College's

»tu«,

1341.

72This author approves of the essential nexus test, but feels that the No//an decision did not go
far enough toward considerations of fairness since the majority opinion "... contains a most
important limitation, one that [Justice Scalia] scarcely explores . .. namely, that the nexus
requirement to be applied in these cases measures not just the closeness of fit between regulatory
means and ends but also whether the burden of the regulation is properly placed on this
landowner." Kmiec, supra note 3, 1651.
73Ibid., 1651. The nuisance exception itself underwent some drastic changes a few years after
No//an. These changes will be discussed in detail, but do not pertain to analysis of this case.
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Nelson A. Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences at which at least eight different
explanations of the decision were presented and debated. 74 Given the multitudes of
differing opinions generated by Nollan, it would appear that the essential nexus
requirement has only complicated matters for coastal managers. Nor did the Court's
opinion offer any clarification of this standard which might help choose among the
theories about their exact meaning. Instead, the majority announced this test and then
carefully detailed all the reasons why the Nollans' permit condition did not fill the
requirement in this case, concluding that: "It is quite impossible to understand how a
requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the
Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new
house. ,,75
While this pronouncement neatly disposed of the permit condition in the Nollans'
case, it offered little assistance to managers attempting to craft effective land-use
regulations which will not run afoul of the takings doctrine. In his dissent, Justice
Brennan takes a positive view of this omission, saying that "the Court's decision ..
will probably have little ultimate impact"?" since the Commission (and presumably
other similar authorities) "should have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its
expertise to demonstrate a specific connection between provisions for access and

"Ftschel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1581, (1988). It is interesting to note that the author of this article demonstrated that many
interpretations of Nollan were possible by explaining how the decision could be "much more likely
to harm developers than to help them." Id., 1588.

7SNollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141,3149.

"Tbid., 3161 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).
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burdens on access produced by new development. "77 Before blithely assuming,
however, that the essential nexus requirement will be easily satisfied, coastal
managers should consider that the experts at the California Coastal Commission
thought they had shown such a connection between their permit condition and the
harm caused by further development. The potential hazards of trying to establish an
essential nexus are demonstrated by the fact that three Supreme Court Justices thought
the Commission had done so as well."
Anyone in the business of coastal management who feels sanguine about their
ability to craft regulatory provisions which will meet the requirement for an essential
nexus should read the Court's opinion more carefully. Rather than offering any
information about what constitutes an essential nexus, Justice Scalia delivers a pointed
warning that establishing one will not be easy in the future." It is obvious from the
discourse between the Justices in this case that several of them held extreme and
opposing views when it came to determining the extent of governmental control over
land uses.

"'Ibid., 3162 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).

"Justice Brennan states this forcefully by saying, "The Court is therefore simply wrong that
there is no reasonable relationsh ip between the permit condition and the specific type of burden on
public access created by the appellants' proposed development." Ibid. , 3157 (Justice Brennan,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun agrees, although in more genteel tones , saying "In my view, the
easement exacted from appellants and the problems their development created are adequately
related ..." Ibid., 3163 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
79"We do not share Justice Brennan's confidence that the Commission 'should have little
difficulty [in demonstrating an essential nexus]' that will avoid the effect of today's decision. We
view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and
compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination." Nollan, 107 s. Ct.
3141, 3150.
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This deep ideological division among the members of the Court appeared to have
grown throughout the 1980's, and it tended to result in decisions, such as Nollan,
which are of limited use in developing appropriate policies. This decision in this case
failed to resolve the underlying conflict, a situation which was hardly advantageous to
either the public or to private landowners. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, "The
land-use problems this country faces require creative solutions. These are not
advanced by an 'eye for an eye' mentality. "so The aftermath, among land-use
planners , of the announcement of the essential nexus test seemed to be frustration.
One economist expressed it by saying, "If the Court is not going to disturb the
existing state of regulatory entitlements . . . then it should at least get out of the way
while those burdened by the regulations and those who control them make mutually
satisfactory bargains. "SI

In summary, it would seem that the addition of the essential nexus test to the
Supreme Court's repertoire in takings decisions only served to make an already
complicated doctrine more complex. An attempt to describe what government actions
might constitute a taking after the 1987 decisions would quickly bog down in a
morass of "if-then-but" statements. Approaching the problem from a different
perspective, one author, Professor Frank Michelman, laid out a series of fairly simple
rules for determining what was not considered a compensable taking:
"A regulation is not a taking if it prevents a nuisance or public
danger. Under other circumstances, it is not a taking unless (a) it

8°/bid., 3163 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
"Fischel, supra note 74, 1581.
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requires a physical invasion of private property, no matter how
trivial or transient, (b) it leaves the owner with no economically
viable use or (c) it entirely divests the owner of some essential
aspect of property such as the right to pass it on to someone after
one dies. 1182
On their surface, these rules appeared to be of value in helping land-use
managers, including coastal managers , to steer clear of regulatory action that would
lead to takings claims, and there was undoubtedly some use in this summary of the
takings doctrine . Even its author, however, realized that there was a potential for
more restrictive interpretation on the part of the judiciary when he pointed out that
II

only the Court . . . seems to know which aspects [of property] are essential and

which are not. 1183 In spite of this continuing ambiguity, the takings doctrine
remained substantially unchanged for another five years, until another beachfront
property owner pursued a challenge to land-use legislation in effect on the opposite
side of the continent. His challenge led to a Supreme Court decision that left the
post-1987 rules explicated by Michelman in a complete jumble and introduced a new
twist to the takings question.

82Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600-1604 (1988), quoted by Fischel,
supra note 74, 1589. The characterization of a government action as a taking of private property
when it deprives the owner of some "fundamental aspect" of property was elucidated by the Court
in Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, (1987) and has been characterized as a view which should
"cause grave concern throughout the environmental community." Note: Hodel v. Irving: The
Supreme Court's Emerging Takings Analysis-A Question of How Many Pumpkin Seeds Per Acre,
18 ENVTL. L. 598 (1988) (authored by John H. Leavitt).
83Michelman, supra note 82, 1589.
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B. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council

In 1988, the state of South Carolina passed legislation which was designed to
prevent further development of the state's barrier beach areas. This environmentally
progressive law was based on sound ecological principles and supported by
observations of the effect of barrier beach development over a period of twelve
years." The law was changed, however, after it was challenged on the basis that it
violated the constitutional rights of a riparian land owner. The legal battle over this
section of the Carolina coast served as a graphic demonstration of the complex
interactions of social, political, legal, and scientific issues that comprise coastal zone
management in the 1990s. Its outcome added a significant (and, from a land-use
planner's perspective, a potentially disastrous) new dimension to the already
convoluted construct of the takings doctrine.
The decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councit" was in large part
unexpected, and it generated concern in many quarters, including among coastal
managers , that the Court" was now moving towards establishing a takings doctrine

84The South Carolina legislature determined that "without adequate controls, development
unwisely has been sited too close to the [barrier beach/dune] system. This type of development
has jeopardized the stability of the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endangered
adjacent property. It is in both the public and private interests to protect the system from this
unwise development. S. C. CODE @@ 43-39-250(4) (1993), copy provided to the author by the
South Carolina Legislative Research Service.
85 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
86Since the decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the composition of the
Supreme Court had been altered. Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall were replaced by Justices
Thomas, Souter, and Kennedy.
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that would be inimical to future environmental regulation endeavors. There has since
been little indication that this is not a valid concern.

1. Facts in the Case
The case revolves around two beachfront lots on the Isle of Palms on the coast of
South Carolina. The two lots were purchased by David Lucas in 1986 and, at the
time of purchase, both state law and existing zoning regulations would have allowed
the construction of single-family residences on the property. 87 Although Lucas's
stated intent was to build such a residence on each lot (one for himself and one for
resale)", no construction had begun when the South Carolina legislature passed the
Beachfront Management Act in 1988. 89
This Act was an extremely aggressive attempt to curtail additional construction in
an area where previous development had resulted in costly damage to both the
environment and to man-made structures. Based on legislative findings which
included that the beach/dune system along the coast of South Carolina protected life
and property by serving as a storm barrier and that development would endanger
adjacent property, the law prohibited the construction of improvements (with a few

81In fact, at the time of purchase Mr. Lucas was not even required to obtain a development
permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council in order to pursue this type of construction. Lucas,
112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889.
88Ka plan and Cohn, supra note 1, 70.
89In fact , in the eighteen months between his purchase of the lots and the passage of the
Beachfront Management Act, David Lucas never applied for a building permit, Lucas, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2917 (Justice Stevens, dissenting); or sought any administrative remedy for his conflict with
the South Carolina Coastal Council. Ibid. , 68 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
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exceptions, such as the construction of wooden decks and walkways) on lots such as
the ones owned by Lucas. 90
Since the physical characteristics of the two lots were relevant to both the debate
in this case and to consideration of the decision's implications for coastal
management, it is worthwhile to relate a description of the property and of Lucas's
relationship to it. The lots in contention were located in the Wild Dune development,
an area which began to experience intense residential construction in the late
1970'S,91 and the land had changed ownership frequently since 1979. 92 In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Blackrnun paints a vivid word-picture of the property:
"The area is notoriously unstable. In roughly half of the last 40
years, all or part of petitioner's property was part of the beach or
flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide. Between 1957
and 1963, petitioner's property was under water. Between 1963
and 1973, the shoreline was 100 to 150 feet onto petitioner's
property. In 1973, the first line of stable vegetation was about
halfway through the property. Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of
Palms issued 12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect
property in the Wild Dunes development. 93
Although it hardly seems prudent to build a home in such an area, the extent of the
shorefront construction surrounding Lucas's lots provided proof enough that many
people were undeterred by the dangers inherent in the location.

90S.C. CODE ANN @@ 48-39-250.
91At the time of the Supreme Court's decis ion in this case, Mr. Lucas had been living in the
Wild Dunes development for fourteen years. He was "a contractor, manager, and part owner" of
the development, and the two Jots in question comprised half of the vacant property left in the
area. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2905 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
92

Ibid.

93

Ibid.
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In fact, the Wild Dunes development seemed to be a prime example of the type of
"overinvestment" which economists and regulators have cautioned will occur when
private land owners can shift the burden of their unwise development costs onto the
public. 94 In coastal areas, this phenomena is often heralded by the construction of
expensive homes in regions which had previously been considered too unstable or
undesirable for use . Speculators buy the land at inflated prices, confident that they
can sell at a profit or recoup losses from the government, and indifferent to the costs
their actions might impose on the public.
There seems to be a perception among some authors describing the efforts to halt
such construction that the recognition of social ills created by unwise development is a
new concept in society. 95 To the contrary, one of the oldest writings our culture
possesses uses the issue of improvident coastal construction as an illustrative
metaphor, describing: "a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand, and the
rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house;
and it fell. ,,96 In biblical times, however, the foolish man had no expectation that
others would pay for the costs of his mistakes. To the lawmakers of South Carolina,
the Beachfront Management Act was an attempt to prevent the mistakes before they
happened , and it is this concept, if any, that is new.
As with many new ideas, this one was not well received by everyone concerned.

94For more detailed discussions of the overinvestment issue from both an economic and a
regulatory standpoint, see Fischel, supra note 74; and Singer, supra note 57.
95See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904 and Cook, supra note 58, 1441.
96Matthew 7:26.
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After the Beachfront Management Act was passed, Lucas filed suit against the
government of South Carolina, specifically the South Carolina Coastal Council,
claiming that the prohibition of construction on his lots in fact amounted to an
uncompensated taking of his property by the government. The trial court agreed,
stating that the construction ban had "deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use
of the lots, . . . and rendered them valueless. ,,97 The court ordered that Lucas be
compensated for this taking of his property by payment of a monetary reimbursement
for the property in question." The state then appealed the case to the South
Carolina Supreme Court who reversed the trial court's decision.
This reversal came about as a result of the State Supreme Court's understanding
of the realm of "regulatory takings" which deprive landowners of some use of their
property without actually physically occupying or confiscating that property. 99
Among the various categories of government actions which might have been
characterized as regulatory takings, the South Carolina Supreme Court believed that
there were those actions that were designed "to prevent serious public harm.i"?" and
that such actions were not subject to the compensation requirement in the takings

97

Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2890.

981n 1986, Lucas paid $975,000 for the two residential lots in question. The trial court ordered
the Council to pay $1,232 ,387.50 for the lots. Ibid., 2889-2890.
99"ln the case of a regulatory taking, the aggrieved property owner normally must bring an
action in inverse condemnation, that is, to force the state to compensate the owner for the
economic impact of its action." My\ott, supra note 14, 1299.

'OOLucas, 1\2 S. Ct. 2886, 2890, quoting 304 S. C. 383,404 S. E. 2d at 899 (citing, inter alia,
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887).
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clause. 101 Since Lucas had not challenged the State legislature's findings regarding
the ecological dangers of developing his lots and had not contested the constitutional
validity of the Beachfront Management Act, the State Supreme Court concluded that
he acknowledged his proposed development to be such a harmful activity. 102
The South Carolina court went on to reason that this tacit acknowledgement of the
problems caused by beach front construction meant that Lucas conceded that the Act
was designed to prevent a serious public harm (such as the environmental degradation
caused by beach erosion, destruction of habitat, storm damage to property, etc.). The
Act was therefore a legitimate exercise of the state's police powers. Although
acknowledging that the value of Lucas's property had been affected, the state argued
that this did not constitute a compensable taking, but instead fell under the canopy of
the nuisance exception. 103
As the foregoing discussion of Nollan demonstrated, the confused state of the
takings doctrine did not provide the South Carolina Supreme Court with the luxury of
a clear precedent or established guidelines to rely on in deciding this case. They were

IOIThis interpretation of the situation by the South Carolina Supreme Court does not seem
inconsistent with the U. S. Supreme Court's takings doctrine up to this point. This "nuisance
exception" to the takings clause was well-known and had been described as "the self-defining
concept that the government may, through its exercise of its police powers, abate an activity it
deems a public nuisance without liability for compensation." Mylott, supra note 14, 1308.
I02The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Lucas "conceded that the beach/dune area of South
Carolina's shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new construction, ...
contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that discouraging new construction
in close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm." Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. 2886, 2896, quoting 304 S. C., at 382-383, 404 S. E. 2d, at 898.
I03S ax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1435 (1993).

37

equipped instead with the ad hoc tests which had been generated by previous
decisions. It is not too surprising, then, that the State Supreme Court arrived at the
same conclusion which adherence to Professor Michelman's rules for the post-1987
takings doctrine (see note 82) would suggest to be valid. Basing their decision on the
fact that "Lucas did not challenge the validity of the legislative findings that a ban on
development was necessary to protect life and property, . . . nor did he question the
validity of the Act as a lawful exercise of the police power, "104 the South Carolina
court stated that no taking had occurred.
It is easy to see that this reversal of the trial court's decision was based on the
extensive case history of takings law as applied to the circumstances of this case.
This history indicated that the state's proper exercise of its police power "to enjoin a
property owner from activities akin to public nuisances"!" did not require
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The complexities of Lucas had not yet
finished developing, however, and further discussion of the fmal disposition must
include some mention of the legal complications that arose even before the U. S.
Supreme Court decided the case.

2. The Effect of Lucas on the Beachfront Management Act
While the lawyers argued in South Carolina, the state legislature was not unaware of
or unaffected by the proceedings. Even before the State Supreme Court handed down

'04Ibid.
105Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897.
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their decision in 1990, lawmakers amended the Beachfront Management Act, perhaps
in the hope of forestalling more million dollar lawsuits. Section 48-39-290(D) was
changed to allow for the issuance of special permits to build "if the structure is not
constructed or reconstructed on a primary oceanfront sand dune or on the active
beach. "106
This amendment to the Act was, and still is, interpreted by some as a bit of
cowardly backpedalling by the legislature. The devastation caused by Hurricane
Hugo along large portions of the South Carolina coast in 1989 had confirmed the
soundness of the 1988 statute and seemed to argue against the changes incorporated in
the 1990 Amendments. 107 Coastal communities, including the Isle of Palms, were
submerged under the storm's five foot wave surge and battered by high winds,
resulting in damage to and loss of beachfront structures. lOS For the 1990
amendments to provide allowances for construction on the same beachfront appeared
to be a betrayal of the original intent of the law. However, a close look at the statute
reveals that it still retained some restrictive provisions.
Under the newly amended Act, a landowner was given the right to apply for a
special building permit under section 48-39-290(D), but no set guidelines for granting

I06S.c. Code Ann. 48-39-290(0), (1993).
J07The damage inflicted on South Carolina by this storm in September, 1989 included "29
deaths and approximately $ 6 billion in property damage, much of it the result of uncontrolled
beachfront development." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2904. In fact, this region has been damaged by
numerous storms since, including the most recent natural disaster, Hurricane Gordon, in November
of 1994.
'08Skelton, Houses On The Sand: Takings Issues Surrounding Statutory Restrictions On The
Use Of Oceanfront Property , 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 125, 130 (1990).
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these permits were given, except that the land use "must not be detrimental to the
public health, safety, or welfare . "109 The decision to grant or deny permits was left
to the discretion of the Permitting Committee who were given authority to "impose
reasonable additional conditions and safeguards" 110 to fulfill the purposes of the Act.
Additionally, the owner of a specially permitted structure could be required to remove
it if any erosion of the beach resulted in the structure becoming located on the active
beach. III
While the compromise embodied in this special permit loophole was no doubt
unsatisfactory to those people with a strong environmental focus, Lucas himself was
unimpressed with the opportunity it presented him to build his houses. He took his
case to the Supreme Court, claiming that he had suffered a temporary taking of his
property prior to the 1990 Amendments and that the remaining constraints (post-1990
Amendments) imposed on his lots were also injurious.!"

I09S.C. Code ANN 48-39-290(0), (1993). The ability of the restrictive portions of the 1990
amendments to withstand constitutional challenges remains to be seen. In fact, it is quite likely
that development permits have simply been extended under this provision in order to escape further
challenges (which the state would most likely lose). No data was available to examine this issue
further.
IIO/bid.
Ill/bid.

112Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2891. The claim of a temporary taking of his property was based
on the 1987 decision in First English, supra note 2, which held that where regulation deprived
owners of all use of their land, compensation could be required even if the deprivation was
temporary. Thus, in Lucas's case, the state was required to compensate him for the restrictions on
his right to build houses on his lots between 1988 and 1990.
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3. Nuisance and Noxious Uses--the Supreme Court decides Lucas
The U. S. Supreme Court agreed with Lucas, and the earlier decision was reversed,
with the case remanded to the circuit level for disposition. In light of the substantial
body of law supporting the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision (based on the
nuisance exception to the takings clause), the reversal of this decision by the U. S.
Supreme Court was a major development in the law. It required that the majority
opinion execute a sharp, yet controlled and somehow justifiable, tum away from what
had been considered longstanding precedent. 113 The impact of this shift in doctrine
on the field of coastal zone management has been profound .
The Supreme Court decision in the case can once again be simply stated, but like

Nollan, the reasoning behind the decision was complex. The Court ruled that where
land use restrictions deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses of the
property, a taking had occurred unless the regulated activity constituted a nuisance
activity subject to prohibition under state common law. 114 This was a significant
departure from the usual application of the nuisance exception, and one which
promised increased difficulty in planning efforts. One author translated this decision
into land-use management terms by saying, "In other words, if a piece of land has no
current market value except in uses that the legislature has found too harmful to

'13The Court did not accomplish this turnabout without generating some controversy and
cynicism, as illustrated by the comment that "in the new world of judicial activism - right-wing
style - led by Antonin Scalia, precedent means little more than a misspelling of the fellow living at
the White House." Kaplan and Cohn, supra note 1, 70 .
114Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1369 ( 1993) .
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allow, the state must now buy the land if it wants to prevent the harmful uses. "115
As the Supreme Court's opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, makes clear, the
logic behind the Lucas decision hinges on the applicability of the "harmful or noxious
uses" principle!" to the facts of the case. This principle is expressed in the
common law maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or the duty of landowners
to exercise their rights in ways that do not harm the interests of other subjects of

law.!" This seems like a straightforward axiom, but in practice the conflicting
needs and desires of property owners make its application far from simple. A
purpose for which one person intends to use their property may be somehow harmful
or distasteful to another person, but still be a legitimate purpose. When such conflicts
arise, the second person (or, in many cases, group of people) will often try to prevent
the offending use. It then becomes the province of the courts to decide which of the
citizens has the better right to exercise their will over the protests of the other.
The decisions in such cases make up the body of nuisance law, which "starts from
an implicit assumption that uses of land may have detrimental effects . . . but still not
necessarily be ... in any sense blameworthy." 118 For many years, the courts have
decided nuisance cases by examining the disputed use and determining whether or not
it was noxious, and then by balancing the interests of the owners against the interests

IISHumbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. 1.
ENVTL. L. 1 (1993).
116Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897.
117

Ibid., 2901.

118Humbach, supra note 115, 10.

42

of the public. The interests of the owners of the property were usually evaluated in
terms of the economic impact associated with prohibiting or restricting their intended
use of their land. 119
It is not surprising that the evolution of nuisance law was highly subjective. In

some cases, the judicial decisions supported land-use restrictions, even those which
were considered inappropriate rather than illegal (such as operating a brewery). 120
In others, the courts supported landowners' challenges to government regulation
which restricted property use. In many cases, especially those involving uses of new
technology, no attempt was made to curtail activities which were clearly noxious. 121
It seems, then, that the legal concept of what constitutes a nuisance is just as slippery

as the takings doctrine itself. Nuisance law has traditionally been a hodge-podge of
principles that were tacked together over the years to deal with land-use crises as they
arose. As one author put it, "The only objective feature that common law nuisance
cases seem to share is that somebody did something, not otherwise a ... crime,
whose consequences had negative effects on others . "122

119Kadlecek, Note: The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of
Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REV. 415, 418 (1993). The author explains that the economic
impact on the property owner was determined by looking at three factors: the effect of a
regulation on the land's market value, the uses of the property that remain viable, and the owner's
reasonable "investment-backed expectations" (quoting Penn Central 438 U. S. at 136) concerning
the property's profitability.

12°Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887), cited by Mylott, supra note 14, 1301.
121This type of decision was often based on the premise that in some circumstances, "there is
often no sensible policy choice but to decide that, on balance, the public interest is best advanced
by allowing the uses (such as important industries) to proceed despite their harmful effects on
neighbors or the community at large." Humbach, supra note 115, 11.
122/bid. ,

13.
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Nevertheless, in the Lucas decision, the Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction
with the use of these principles to decide the takings issue. Justice Scalia makes it
clear that the Court no longer considers the subjective nature of the harmful or
noxious uses principle appropriate for determining whether a land-use restriction is
compensable . In an often-quoted passage, this principle is called "simply the
progenitor of our more contemporary statements that 'land-use regulation does not
effect a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests.

'It

123

This

statement heralded the Court's abrupt abandonment of a part of the takings doctrine
which had served to resolve land-use disputes for over a century , leaving the
dimensions of its contemporary standard unclear.
This sudden departure, according to the Lucas majority, was due to the ambiguity
inherent in determining what sort of activity amounts to a noxious or harmful use
which would bring the nuisance exception to the takings clause into play. The Court
insisted that it was impossible to establish an objective standard for discerning the
difference between government regulatory actions that prevented harm and those that
conferred benefits upon the public. 124 In light of this difficulty, "it becomes selfevident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory
takings -- which require compensation -- from regulatory deprivations that do
not. "125

123Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2897, quoting Nollan 107 S. Ct., at 3147, quoting Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U. S., at 260.

124Lw:as, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897.
125/bid.,2899.
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Justice Scalia's explanation for the Court's inability to make this determination
was reminiscent of his words regarding the nature of an essential nexus in Nollan.
He was disturbed that "whether one or the other [harm-preventing or benefit
conferring] characterizations will come to one's lips in a particular case depends
primarily upon one's evaluation of the worth of competing uses of real estate.

11126

As Justice Scalia expressed the Court's view, the state legislatures would also be
unable (or perhaps unwilling) to make an objective distinction as to the true purpose
of a law.
Legislative findings which indicated that an action would prevent a public harm
therefore became useless in invalidating takings claims. Instead of being viewed as
lawmakers' efforts to protect the public as "society's malefactors discovered ever new
kinds of mischief to plague the rest of us, "127 such findings were seen by the Lucas
Court as merely a clever recitation of "a harm-preventing justification for [the
lawmakers'] action. "128 In another echo of his tone in Nollan, Justice Scalia rather
contemptuously dismisses as inadequate the test of whether a regulation prevents
harm. Since it would be easy for lawmakers to adopt harm-preventing phraseology in
their findings, this once valid inquiry suddenly just "amounts to a test of whether the
legislature has a stupid staff."!" The Court was careful, however, not to

'26Ibid., 2898.

127Humbach, supra note 115, 18.
128 Lucas , 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898.
129Ibid.
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completely discredit the concept that the state can limit actions which are nuisances.
Instead, it said that a law or regulation which imposes such severe restrictions on land
use that all economically beneficial uses are prohibited must "inhere in the title itself,
in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership. "130
The Lucas decision in effect reshuffled and re-prioritized the rules of the takings
doctrine. A regulation is now always to be considered a compensable taking if it (a)
involves a physical occupation of private property, no matter how slight or (b) it
deprives the owner of all economically viable use. In the second instance, the taking
of private property might not be compensable only if it falls under the severely
curtailed nuisance exception. The nuisance exception can no longer be applied to
laws that expand the category of harmful land use, but must "do no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts ... under the State's
law of private nuisance or by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances. "131 Regulatory actions that do not meet either of these two absolute
criteria for categorical takings must be evaluated in terms of the "ad hoc, factual
inquir[y] "132 that characterized most takings decisions in the past.

13°/bid., 2900, emphasis added.

132Kadlecek, supra note 119,418, quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U. S. 104 (1978).
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4. Views on the Lucas Categorical Takings Test
After Lucas's case was remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court for review
using these new criteria, that court rather quickly ruled that Lucas had in fact suffered
a taking of his property and was entitled to receive payment. That taking, however,
was only a temporary one since the 1990 amendment to the Beachfront Management
Act now allowed the opportunity for building on his lotS. 133 This ended four years
of legal wrangling for David Lucas, but the controversy over the meaning of the
Supreme Court's decision had just begun.
If there was anything about the Lucas decision that almost everyone agreed upon,

it was that no one cared for it much. The extent of this dissatisfaction was made
evident by the controversy that the opinion generated among the members of the
Court themselves. Justice Souter, for example, filed a separate statement arguing that
the case should never have been decided. His reasons for taking this stance were
fairly simple, and they addressed one of the issues which makes analysis of the
decision so complicated, namely the assumption that the Beachfront Management Act
had deprived Lucas of "his entire economic interest in the subject property . "134
While it remains indisputable that the owner was denied his intended use for the
property, it seemed to be quite a stretch to conclude that there was no other possible
economically beneficial use available to him. Since the Court did not attempt to
explain how this total deprivation was identified in Lucas's case, it did not provide

133Lazarus, Putting the Correct 'Spin' on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (1993) .
134Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2925 (statement of Justice Souter).
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any criteria for recognizing when such deprivations would occur in future cases.
Justice Souter also pointed out that the majority's insistence that destruction of land's
economic uses would only be noncompensable if supported by the state's common law
of nuisance was contradictory to the very nature of that nuisance law. He writes that
"it is difficult to imagine property that can be used only to create a nuisance, such
that its sole economic value must presuppose the right to occupy it for such seriously
noxious activity." 135
Justice Kennedy, who had joined the Court between the Nollan and Lucas
decisions, expressed similar "reservations ... about [the] finding that a beach front
lot loses all value because of a development restriction. "136 In his concurring
statement, however, his primary objection to the majority opinion was that the Court
failed to examine some relevant issues, and so erred in the limitations it placed on the
nuisance exception. He believed that "the finding of no value must be considered ..
. by reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations. "137 These
expectations must in turn "be understood in light of the whole of our legal
tradition, "138 and "the common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the
exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society. "139 Although

IJ5Ibid., 2926 (statement of Justice Souter).
136Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (Justice Kennedy, concurring).
137Ibid.
1J8Ibid.
139Ibid.
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Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgement, it was clear that he was disturbed by the
implications of the Court's decision to severely curtail the state's ability to exercise
the police power in the prevention of noxious uses of property.
The dissenting opinion written by Justice Blackmun indicates, in no uncertain
terms, that he shares these same misgivings by saying:
"Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse... My fear
is that the Court's new policies will spread beyond the narrow
confines of the present case. For that reason, I, like the Court, will
give far greater attention to this case than its narrow scope suggests-not because I can intercept the Court's missile, or save the targeted
mouse, but because I hope perhaps to limit the collateral
damage. "140

As this passage implies, the dissenting Justices agreed with Justice Souter that the
Court should not have decided the case in the first place, and their reasons for this
belief involved Lucas's failure to apply for a special permit after the 1990
Amendments were passed or to in any other way seek an administrative remedy for
his troubles. 141 Justice Steven's dissent places even more emphasis on the relevance
of Lucas's actions with regard to the land, questioning the validity of even a
temporary takings claim in light of the fact that "the record does not tell us whether

14°lbid., 2904 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
141Justice Blackmun made no attempt to express his sentiments diplomatically, as the newer
members of the Court had done. He comments that, "my disagreement with the Court begins with
its decision to review this case." Ibid., 2906 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting). He points out that the
state of South Carolina "from the very beginning of this litigation ... has argued that the courts:
'lack jurisdiction in this matter because [Lucas] has sought no authorization from Council for use
of his property, has not challenged the location ~f the baseli~e or setba:k line ... a~d because n~
final agency decision has been rendered concerning use of his property ... [and this argument] IS
undoubtedly correct." Ibid., 2907 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
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[Lucas's] building plans were even temporarily frustrated by the enactment of the
statute. "142
In addition to questioning the wisdom of deciding the case at all, Justice Blackmun
was dubious of the finding that Lucas was deprived of all of his property's economic
value , calling such a conclusion "almost certainly erroneous. "143 Justice Stevens'
dissent addresses the issue by stating outright that even if Lucas were not allowed to
build on the lots, his land was "far from 'valueless. "1\44 It is clear that this finding
of total deprivation generated a great deal of controversy among the members of the
Court, and caused some of them to be uneasy about the effect of this somewhat
tenuous standard on future decisions. It was difficult to identify the definition of
property being used in Lucas, since "the Court offers no basis for its assumption that
the only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution are developmental
uses. "145 These members of the Court are not alone in finding fault with Lucas.
One legal scholar sharply criticized the Court's decision as limited and inept, because

"Lucas 's outdated view of property ... is not satisfactory in an age of ecological

142Ibid., 2917 (Justice Stevens, dissenting). In Justice Stevens' opinion, it is noteworthy that
"petitioner acquired the lot about 18 months before the statute was passed; [but] there is no
evidence that he ever sought a building permit from the local authorities." Ibid.
143Ibid., 2908 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting). Justice Blackmun expands on this point, saying,
"the trial court appeared to believe that the property could be considered 'valueless' if it was not
available for its most profitable use. Absent that erroneous assumption, ... I find no evidence ...
supporting the . . . conclusion that the damage to the lots by virtue of the restrictions was 'total.'"
Ibid.
144Ibid., 2919 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
145Ibid.
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awareness . "146
There have been many criticisms of the case. Some expressed unhappiness with
the ruling from a purely theoretical standpoint, arguing that it was vague and
problematic. One author who held this view outlined what he perceived to be
numerous technical flaws in the majority opinion and concluded that although "the
Court's ... aspiration to improve the [takings] doctrine is commendable . .. the
ruling in Lucas is not a step in the right direction. "1 47 The concern most frequently
cited by those who viewed the decision unfavorably was that in limiting the nuisance
exception to encompass only those actions already prohibited under common law, the
Court was crippling the essential growth of that body of law. 148 Since the common
law concept of nuisance evolved at least partially from legislative action,"? this
limitation meant that the states had been deprived of an historical mechanism for
responding to change.
This issue is perhaps the one most relevant to coastal management efforts. The
fragile and constantly changing coastal zone is an area that has often felt the

146Sax, Property Rights and the Economy ofNature : Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1455 (1993).
147Fisher, The Trouble With Lucas, 45 STAN . L. REV . 1393, 1410 (1993). These sentiments
are echoed by Cook, who calls the Court's new economic benefits threshold test for takings
"flawed because it does not accomplish any other results than those available under the old ad hoc
analysis, [and it] creates a per se rule more complicated than the ad hoc inquiry . .." Cook, supra
note 58, 1440.
14S"The Court's holding today effectively freezes the State 's common law, denying the
legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of
property." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 , 2921 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
149" . .. legislatures have traditionally had authority to add new kinds of public mischief to the
list of public nuisances." Humbach, supra note 115, 18.
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deleterious impacts of new industries. It will undoubtedly do so again in the future,
but the rules set forth in Lucas may prevent state or local governments from taking
action to preserve their resources. This concern should occur to all land-use
managers since "under these new regulations, a property owner will never be subject
to the rule's [nuisance] exception"!" if their action was not recognized as a
common law nuisance in 1992. It requires only a cursory recollection of the
technological developments of the past forty years (or even of the past ten years) to
realize that this is a short-sighted policy for the evolution of laws which must deal
with such changes.':"
This complaint is singularly significant because the arena of emerging social and
environmental consciousness is perhaps one of the most hotly contested of the realms
in which the common law of nuisance can no longer accommodate change . For a
person who accepts the environmentalist view that construction on barrier beaches
creates a hazard for the public and destroys a valuable resource, it seems clear that
Lucas's proposed development should be prohibited. However, "neither construction
nor agriculture currently meets the test of 'grounding' in 'background principles of
nuisance and property law '"!" since "both are commonly practiced and viewed as

150Cook, supra note 58, 1441.
'5lProfessor Humbach expressed this eloquently by saying, "As knowledge, needs, and social
values evolve with time and changed circumstances, what once seemed innocuous may grow
noxious, while the noxious may become benign. A century ago, for example, beer and margarine
were considered harmful enough substances to justify a legal ban, while opiates were sold without
prescription and Coca-Cola contained cocaine." Humbach, supra note 115, 17.
152Kadlecek, supra note 119, 431, quoting Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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appropriate activities.V" Those people who are more skeptical of claims of
environmental damage will embrace the Court's new doctrine's' and be likely to
pursue takings claims. Faced with the extensive Lucas limitations on the application
of the police power, state legislatures will undoubtedly be more cautious about
curtailing property rights .
Fortunately, this restriction on the nuisance exception is not relevant to those
instances where a regulation does not deprive the owners of all economically
beneficial use of their land. It seems likely that, in view of Lucas, state governments
and other regulatory bodies will strive to prevent the courts from making such a
finding in any takings challenge. Barring any significant doctrinal changes from the
Supreme Court, this may not prove to be too difficult, as even the Lucas majority
admitted .!" There is a possibility however, that the decision may presage such a
doctrinal shift, one which could pose a more subtle danger to sensible environmental
policy efforts .
The Lucas Court implied a willingness to re-evaluate the definition of property

I

53Ibid.

154The Lucas majority insisted that the Court did not develop a new rule, but simply elaborated
on a "long-established standard." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 , 2894 . There seemed to be a lack of
support for this claim in the opinion, and it was repudiated by both dissenting Justices, one of
whom wrote, "When the government regulation prevents the owner from any economically
valuable use of his property, the private interest is unquestionably substantial, but we have never
before held that no public interest can outweigh it." Ibid. , 2910 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
Justice Stevens was even more emphatic, stating that "the Court's new rule is unsupported by prior
decisions, arbitrary and unsound in practice, and theoretically unjustified." Ibid., 2920 (Justice
Stevens, dissenting).
155The Court characterized situations where the government deprives a landowner of all
economically beneficial use as "relatively rare." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894.
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once again, this time by dispensing with the "no-segmentation" rule which provides
that: "'Taking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether . . . a taking [has occurred], this Court focuses rather
... on ... the parcel as a whole." 156 If this rule is invalidated in the future,
instances where the government will be found to have deprived an owner of all
economically beneficial use of property might become quite common since the unit of
property in question can be viewed as smaller and more limited in scope. Several
analysts of property law have identified this as the most significant of the implications
of Lucas. 157
While people interested in conservation or environmentally sound use of the
coastal zone are concerned about Lucas's restrictions on legislation, property rights
supporters bemoan the fact that the Court did not go far enough in limiting regulatory
power. The economic misfortunes currently being experienced by many people tend
to make them protective of their remaining assets and add credence to the idea that
excessive government regulatory action "has resulted in a massive federal taking of

156Humbach, supra note 115, 21, quoting Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U. S. 104, 130-31 (1978). The author notes that the Lucas Court "displayed a marked lack of
enthusiasm" for the rule, and that it had indicated the possibility of change by characterizing past
applications of the rule as '" inconsistent pronouncements. 'It Ibid. , 22.
157See, for example, Kadlecek, supra note 119, 434, concluding that "Lucas will have little
substantive effect on the outcome of takings challenges in the lower courts. However, if the Court
permits 'piecemealing' of property interests, the takings doctrine in future years may require
compensation for a far greater number of land use restrictions."
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private property. "158 It is mostly individuals who belong to this group who feel that

Lucas failed to protect property owners.
Richard A. Epstein, co-author of one of the briefs presented to the Court on
Lucas's behalf and a prominent property-rights proponent (see note 1), complained
that while the decision was an important one in takings jurisprudence it was not
definitive enough. In his view, the categorical rule describing a loss of all
economically beneficial use of property as a per se taking was a laudable
development. He felt, however, that even the sharply limited nuisance exception still
allowed to state legislatures was too much and he complained that "what the Court
gave with one hand, it took away with the other. "159 At the root of Epstein's
dispute with Lucas was his belief that the Court deliberately limited the scope of their
decision in this case in order to ensure that it would not "bring many more forms of
land use regulation within the Takings Clause, where they could receive the close
scrutiny and swift dispatch that most of them so richly deserve. "160
Epstein received support for his opinion that Lucas was not a triumph for property
rights from some surprising sources. David Gardiner, legislative director of the
Sierra Club, expressed a belief that "The Court's ruling . .. represents a significant
defeat for those who predicted that the Court would announce a major enlargement of

158Roberts, Takings by the Bureaucracy: The Economy, and Legal and Property Rights, 58
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 744, 749 (1 October 1992).
'59Epstein, supra note 114, 1369.
160

Ibid., 1392.
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property rights . . ." 161 In fact, there were some people who made the argument
that the ultimate effect of the Lucas decision would be beneficial for regulatory efforts
by making it harder for takings suits to succeed. Lazarus constructed a nearconvincing case that the ruling actually "signals the emergence of a takings analysis
that is more receptive to environmental concerns. 11162
So far, the Court has not elaborated or expanded on the Lucas doctrine, and their
future intentions as to the issues raised in the case must remain a matter of
speculation. There have been indications in the ensuing years as to which direction
the Court is leaning, and it appears to be favoring the land-use philosophies of
Epstein. This propensity was demonstrated in the 1994 session'?', when the Court
decided a case reminiscent of Nollan in which a store owner alleged a taking when a
city government imposed conditions on her permit to expand her facilities .

C.

Dolan v. City of Tigard
This case, unlike Nollan and Lucas, did not involve a land-use dispute in the

coastal zone. Nonetheless, the Court's decision was the next step in the progression
begun by the two cases previously discussed, and it was a continuation of the

16lLazarus, supra note 133, 1411.

1621bid., 1431.
163The composition of the Supreme Court did not change as greatly between 1992 ~nd 1?94 as
it had between the decisions in Nollan and Lucas. The only Justice to leave the Court In this
period was Justice White who was replaced by Clinton-nominee Justice Ginsburg.
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development of a new takings doctrine. In fact, the Court stated explicitly that their
intention in deciding Dolan v. City of Tigard was "to resolve a question left open by
our decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Council. . ." 164 There seems to be
general agreement among planners that the Dolan decision "announced a sweeping
new federal takings standard . . . that promises to significantly alter local government
practices" 165 in regulating development.
Such a change will inevitably have substantial impacts on the practices of land
management in all areas of the country, including the coastal zone. As anticipated by
property rights supporters (see note 164), the Court's decision in this case was not a
departure from the trends of the late 1980's and earlier years of this decade. It seems
to have dealt a death-blow to the theory that "the American landbase is seen, more
than ever, as a shared resource of all, "166 and to the idea that there is widespread
agreement that this resource deserves significant efforts at either protection or prudent
use.

1. Facts in the Case

164Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2312. In an article published prior to the decision,
one lawyer and property-rights proponent speculated (tongue-in-cheek) that perhaps the Court
chose this particular case to expand on Nollan so that any new takings test arising from the
decision would have a catchy name: the NollaniDolan rule. Berger, Nollan Meets Dolan Rollin'
Down the Bikepath, 46 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3,4 (February 1994). While this
frivolous suggestion seems unlikely, the tone of the article conveys the impression that the
property-first supporters are confident of their movement's support from the Court.
165Morgan, Exactions as Takings Tactics for Dealing with Dolan, 46 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 3 (September, 1994).
166Humbach, supra note 8, 341.
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The basic facts in this case were fairly uncomplicated, lacking in many of the
complex side issues found in the previously discussed decisions. Florence Dolan
wanted to expand her existing plumbing and electric supply store located in the
Central Business District of the city of Tigard, Oregon and she applied for a permit to
do so. 167
The City Planning Commission granted her the permit, on the condition that she
dedicate approximately 10% of her lot to the city, specifically "the portion of her
property lying within the lOO-year floodplain ... and an additional I5-foot strip of
land adjacent to the floodplain. "168 The permit conditions were imposed through the
use of a flexible zoning technique known as overlay zoning,"? and they were in
accordance with the city's Community Development Code (CDC) and Master
Drainage Plan , both of which had been adopted to meet the state's requirement for a
comprehensive land use management plan. 170

167Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2313. The addition for which Dolan requested a permit increased
the size of her store from 9,700 square feet to 17,600 square feet and it included plans for paving a
39-space parking lot on the property. Ibid.
'68Ibid., 2314 . Although she would have been dedicating the land to the city, Dolan would still
have been able use that 10% of her property towards meeting the city 's zoning requirement that
15% of her lot be open space and landscaping. Ibid.

1690verlay zoning is defined as "a technique in which new, more restrictive zoning is 'laid
over' a zone already in existence in order to regulate or restrict certain uses that are permitted by
the underlying zoning regulation," and the constitutionality of this type of flexible zoning has been
upheld by state courts. SALSICH, supra note 10, 163. Not surprisingly, property-first advocates
dislike overlay zoning, seeing it as "a device by which a city telegraphs that it doesn 't really intend
to abide by the underlying zoning, but, instead , intends to impose some additional conditions on
development." Berger, supra note 164, 3.

17°Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2313. Specifically, the CDC required that all new development
would be subject to the requirement for the dedication of land to be used in the construction of a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway through the Central Business District, a pathway designed to reduce
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The requirement for dedication of the land within the floodplain was not
particularly unusual. The risks of building structures in such areas have been wellknown for years , and it is not uncommon to find restrictions on development of
property located in the floodplain. 171 Nor did the courts, including the Supreme
Court, question the city's right to use overlay zoning to regulate the development in
the floodplain. In fact, the Dolan Court pointed out once again that '" government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change. "'172
The requirement that the property owner also dedicate an additional strip of land
for use in the municipal bike path caused a great deal more furor. The fact that this
land was to be used in extending the municipal pedestrian/bike path raised the
suspicion that "what the city wanted was not an amount of land sufficient [to mitigate
the effects of Dolan 's development]; what it wanted was a particular I5-foot strip of
land that Dolan happened to own. "173 Yet similar property exactions have been
widely used by municipal governments to obtain land for use in public projects such

traffic congestion in the area. Ibid., 2314. The Drainage Plan recommended that in order to
combat the dangers of flooding, the Fanno Creek Basin (next to Dolan's property) be improved
through channel excavation and that it be kept free of structures. Ibid.,2314.
'71A floodplain is defined as "a natural overflow area adjoining surface waters, including
streams, rivers, lakes, estuaries, bays, and the open ocean." PLATT, supra note 4, 238. The 100year floodplain is that area which has a 1 percent probability of being flooded in any given year ,
and it is this geographic region which is most commonly the area regulated by land use
management plans. Ibid., 239.

InDolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393,
413.
173Kelly, Supreme Court Strikes Middle Ground on Exactions Test, 46 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 6 (July 1994).
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as streets and drainage facilities throughout the nation's history. 174 The results of
such projects were regarded as beneficial to both the public and to the private land
owners whose property was served by the facilities. In this particular case, it was
argued that "Dolan 's acceptance of the permit, with its attached conditions, would
provide her with benefits that may well go beyond any advantage she gets from
expanding her business. "175 It seems likely that the somewhat unorthodox public
purpose of constructing a pedestrian/bicycle pathway vice a more conventional
roadway contributed to the increased level of scrutiny afforded the city's land
dedication requirement.
Unhappy with the permit requirement that she deed a portion of her property to
the city, Dolan requested a variance'" from the CDC standards for new
development, arguing that the proposed store addition and parking lot would not
conflict with the policies of the comprehensive land use management plan."? In the
process of evaluating this request for a variance, the City Planning Commission set
forth a series of findings regarding the impacts of the proposed development and the
degree to which these impacts were related to the conditions imposed on Dolan 's
building permit. Basically, the city found that the new, larger store would attract

174Morgan, supra note 165, 4.
I

75Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2324 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).

'76A variance is "an administrative exception granted [by the zoning authority] to relieve a
'hardship' to a property owner who cannot make reasonable use of his or her land if the applicable
zoning regulations are strictly enforced." PLATT, supra note 4, 188.
177Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2314.
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more customers and add to the traffic problems in the vicinity, but that the
pedestrian/bicycle path across the property would reduce this negative impact by
providing a viable alternative transportation method. 178 The city also found that the
requirement for dedicating the floodplain portion of the lot was warranted by the
paved parking lot included as a part of the new development since the pavement
would increase the impervious surface on the property, adding to the amount of
runoff into an "already strained creek and drainage basin. "179
In accordance with these findings, the Commission denied Dolan's request for a
variance. When an appeal failed to produce the desired result, she brought suit
against the city alleging that the permit conditions constituted a taking of her property
without just compensation.P" The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon
Supreme Court both rejected her arguments and upheld the city's zoning efforts based
on the conclusion that the city had shown that there was a "reasonable
relationship"!" between Dolan's proposed development and the permit conditions
imposed . The Oregon Supreme Court specifically, and perhaps unwisely, rejected the
landowner's contention that the Supreme Court had "abandoned the 'reasonable

178Ibid., 2315. Opponents of the city's policies were quick to mock this assertion with the
image of consumers riding around the bikepath with the "kitchen sink" propped between the
handlebars, as though Dolan 's store sold nothing that could be transported by a bicyclist. Berger,
supra note 164, 4.
I

79Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2315.

18°Ibid., 2315.
181Ibid.
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relationship' test in favor of a stricter 'essential nexus' test," 182 instead interpreting
the Nollan decision to mean that it was sufficient to show that the exaction served the
same purpose as denial of the pennit would have served.!" If the intention of the
Oregon courts was to test the Supreme Court's current attitude toward the volatile
takings issue and the current state of the doctrines expressed in Nollan and Lucas, 184
they received an emphatic answer from the Dolan Court . Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court, avoiding for the most part the colorful
rhetoric found in the Nollan and Lucas decisions. The Dolan opinion built on those
two previous cases, but outlined a new requirement concerning regulatory takings.

2. The Dolan "Rough Proportionality" Test
The decision in this case has been described as establishing a new, three-part
takings test.!" but in fact the first two "parts" of the test were simply an application
of tests developed in previous decisions, the requirement that a land use restriction
serve a legitimate public purpose and the existence of an essential nexus between

I

82Ibid.

183 Ibid.
184ft almost seems that the Oregon Supreme Court couched their decision in language that was
sure to draw fire from the Supreme Court. One law professor and commentator on recent takings
decisions pointed this out: "In fact, ignoring the essential nexus test [from Nollan] may be too
gentle a characterization [of the Oregon Court's decision]. The Oregon court virtually rubs the
Nollan majority's collective nose in reasonable relationship in paragraph after paragraph, citing [the
essential nexus test] only [once]... for 'purposes of discussion.'" Callies, After Nollan: Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 46 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4, 5 (February 1994) .
185Callies, Nexus Redux on Required Land Dedications, 46 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG . 3
(July 1994).
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permit conditions and the purpose they were supposed to further. The new standard,
or third test, applied by the Dolan decision was in itself a more refined and highly
exacting extension of the Nollan essential nexus test: a determination of "the required
degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed
development. ,,186 The Court stated that the required degree of connection was a
"rough proportionality. "187 Although this test was, like previous takings tests, open
to a certain degree of interpretation, it is useful to understand how the Dolan majority
arrived at their conclusions .
The Court's approach to deciding this case was similar to the logic used in Nollan,
not surprising given the degree of similarity between the two cases. The majority
opinion begins with the familiar-sounding statement that "had the city simply required
petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than
conditioning the grant of her permit to develop her property on such a dedication, a
taking would have occurred. "188 The Court recognized the city's legitimate need to
engage in land-use planning, however, and re-stated the constitutional validity of a
regulation which "substantially advances legitimate state interests" without denying an
owner "economically viable use of his land. "189 The issue, examined in such detail
in Lucas, of whether the regulation in question would deprive Dolan of the

Dolan, ]] 4 S. Ct. 2309, 23] 7.

186

187/bid.,23]9.
188/bid.,2316.
189Ibid., citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980).
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economically beneficial use of her property was briefly evaluated and dismissed. It
was clear that even outright denial of a permit to expand the store would leave her
with the economic use she enjoyed before the whole controversy began. 190
The Court then disposed of the question of whether or not the required
dedication of a portion of Dolan's land would advance a legitimate state purpose,
concluding that the city government's action was consistent with "the type of
legitimate public purpose[s] we have upheld"!" in the past. Having established
this, the Court turned to the Nollan essential nexus test, and applied it to the present
situation. Although the Oregon Supreme Court had discounted the importance of this
test, the City Planning Commission had not done so. The permit conditions appear to
have been carefully crafted so as not to run afoul of that important requirement. In
their analysis, the Dolan Court concluded quickly that it was "obvious that a nexus

exists"!" between the requirement for land dedication and the purposes of
preventing flood damage and lessening traffic congestion.
Up to this point, it seemed the city of Tigard had satisfied the constitutional
requirements for imposing a valid permit condition on a property owner in accordance
with the Supreme Court's takings doctrine. However, the Court was not satisfied that
this adherence to previous doctrines provided an adequate answer to all the issues
raised by Dolan in her complaint. In this case, the property owner contended "that

\90Ibid.
191Ibid.,2318.
192Ibid.
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the city . . . forced her to choose between the building pennit and her right under the
Fifth Amendment to just compensation. "193

Additionally, the Court considered

Dolan's case to be different from previous regulatory cases because the city had
"made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building
permit on an individual parcel" 194 rather than basing their pennit requirements on
"essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city . "195
Finally, the fact that the city sought to obtain possession of the property was a
point of concern. The Court pointed out that the resulting "loss of her ability to
exclude others . .. [deprived Dolan ot] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property. '" 196 In an undoubtedly
deliberate echo of their language in Nollan , the majority stated that: "It is difficult to
see why recreational visitors trampling along petitioner's floodplain easement are
sufficiently related to the city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along
Fanno Creek. "197
In their efforts to resolve these issues, the Dolan majority looked to the precedents

193 Ibid., 2317. The Court's opinion reiterated that "under the well-settled doctrine of
' unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right ... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the property
sought has little or no relationship to the benefit." Ibid., citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S.
593, 33 (1972) .
194Kelly, supra note 173, 7. This author maintained that the "adjudicative decision" language
in Dolan will protect many types of subdivision exactions from scrutiny, limiting the effect of the
decision.
195Ibid.

I

" Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2320, quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979).

197Ibid., 2320.
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established by state courts to determine "whether [the Commission's findings
regarding the permit conditions] are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions
imposed by the city on petitioner's building pennit. "198 The Court's analysis of
these state court decisions rejected standards that were considered to be too stringent
or too lax, settling on the requirement that the government demonstrate some degree
of rough proportionality "between the required dedication and the impact of the
proposed development. "199
Like previous takings cases, the Dolan decision generated vehement disagreement
among the members of the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens, who has consistently
opposed the ongoing development of the Court's pro-property rights takings doctrine,
disliked the results in this case to such an extent that he "insisted on reading his
dissent aloud from the bench (something done on only rare occasion these days) . "200
The majority's announcement of the new takings test was described in this dissenting
opinion as a decision to "erect a new constitutional hurdle in the path of [previously
valid land-use permit] conditions, "201 giving credence to the idea that the
progression of takings law in the past decade has been little more than a path to
securing "judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that Members of this

198/bid.,2318.
199/bid.,2319.
2°OBerger, Not Always Right to Try to Get As Much As You Can, 46 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 4 (July 1994).
201 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2323 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
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Court view as unwise or unfair . "202 Countering this assertion, the majority opinion
presented their new rough proportionality test as merely the resolution of a question
raised in Nollan but left unanswered due to the particular facts of that case.f"
Justice Steven's disagreement with the majority went beyond his dislike of the
perception that "the Court is really writing on a clean slate rather than merely
applying 'well-settled' doctrine. "204 Having stated his objections to the formulation
of the rough proportionality test in the first place'?', his dissent points out that
"even under the Court's new rule, both defects [that the majority found in the city's
case] are, at most, nothing more than harmless error. "206 The first of these
involved the dedication of land in the floodplain to the city for public use, a
requirement Justice Stevens admits was not necessarily absolute but which might have
been more beneficial to Dolan than a prohibition on construction in this area would

202Ihid., 2327 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
203Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317. The Court seemed intent on stressing the view that the
development of the rough proportionality test was merely an extension of Nollan, not a new
requirement: "We were not required to reach this question in Nollan, because we concluded that
the connection did not meet even the loosest standard. Here, however, we must decide this
question." Ibid.
204Ibid., 2328 (Justice Stevens, dissenting) .
205Justice Stevens points out that the Court's decision lacks federal precedent and asserts that
the state court decisions the majority relies on "either fail to support or decidedly undermine the
Court's conclusions in key respects." Ibid., 2323 (Justice Stevens, dissenting). He calls the
formulation of the new takings test "unjustified when all tools needed to resolve the questions
presented by this case can be garnered from our existing case law." Ibid., 2326 (Justice Stevens,
dissenting).

Ibid., 2326 .

206

67

have been. 207
The second defect identified by the Dolan Court concerned the city's lack of any
quantitative analysis of the amount of traffic the new store would generate and the
ability of the bike path to offset this effect. The majority stated that:

"No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the
dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory
statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand
generated. "208

Given the Court's reluctance to be more specific about just what, other than precise
mathematical calculation, would constitute a quantitative fmding on the part of the
city, it is not surprising that one of the most immediate implications of the decision
was that it left "a lot to be litigated. "209 Another implication was that the majority
was , in this case, indulging in the same sort of verbal "gimmickry'?'? which the

Nollan majority had accused the California Coastal Commission of using. Both
dissenting opinions pointed out this weakness in the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens

207Ibid., 2326 (Justice Stevens, dissenting). In response to the majority's complaint that "the
city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the
interest of flood control," Ibid., 2320; Justice Stevens countered that "it seems likely that potential
customers 'trampling along petitioner's floodplain ' are more valuable than a useless parcel of
vacant land." Ibid.,2326.
208Ibid" 2319-2320.
209M organ , supra note 165, 6. Justice Stevens shares this apprehension that the decision
signalled that the Court was "extending its welcome mat to a significant new class of litigants."
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309 , 2326 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).

2lODolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2317.
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referring to it as "nothing more than a play on words, " 211 and Justice Souter noting
that "the Court concludes that the City loses based on one word ("could" instead of
"would"), and despite the fact' that the record shows the connection the Court looks
for. " 212
It is clear that, like Justice Blackmun in his Lucas dissent, Justice Stevens believes

that the Court's decision in Dolan amounted to a reckless abandonment of valuable
legal doctrines in the pursuit of broadening the range of property rights which "matter
mightily to this Court. "213 One of the most worrisome aspects of the decision was
that it "built on another aspect of Lucas, in which the Court expressed the view that
taking all rights in a discrete portion of the property .. . could be a taking. "214
Justice Stevens' dissent devoted considerable time in trying to reassert the longstanding doctrine that "'a claimant's parcel of property [cannot] first be divided into
what was taken and what was left' to demonstrate a compensable taking. "215
He was also disturbed by the new test's criteria that the government entity
involved be the one to establish proof that the regulatory permit conditions satisfy the
proportionality requirement, and concerned about the effects of this decision on future

21IIbid., 2326 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
2I2Ibid., 2331 (Justice Souter, dissenting).
213Callies, supra note 185, 4.
214Berger, supra note 200, 5.
215Dolan , 114 S. Ct. 2309,2324 (Justice Stevens, dissenting), quoting Concrete Pipe &
Products, Inc . v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993).
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takings suits.?" The statement that, "the Court has made a serious error by
abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a novel
burden of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid comprehensive land use

plan"!" was echoed by Justice Souter's dissent as well.?"
Once again, the response to the Court's decision has been varied , depending on
the author's stance regarding property rights. Those who adhere to the property-first
philosophy have applauded the decision as a firm statement from the Court that
"property owners are not mere obstacles scattered around the countryside to impede
order and propriety. " 219 More moderate voices asserted that the Dolan decision is
"no ... threat .. . to the ability of a community to zone or otherwise regulate land
use, "220 since all that the decision prohibited was "a negotiated exaction where the
exaction is based on the needs of the city and not on the impacts of the
development. " 221 Still other commentators expressed the opinion that the Dolan test
may now apply to all subdivision exactions, such as those for sidewalks and streets,
and voiced concerns that "municipalities will abandon worthy public improvement

216Ibid., 2323 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
217Ibid. , 2326 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
218" . .. the Court has placed the burden of producing evidence of relationship on the city ,
despite the usual rule in cases involving the police power that the government is presumed to have
acted constitutionally." Ibid., 2331 (Justice Souter, dissenting).
219Berger, supra note 200, 4.
22'1<elly, supra note 173,7 .
22 I

Ibid.
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programs rather than face potential liability. "222 From a land management
perspective, it does seem that the Dolan decision illustrates a frustrating judicial trend
to stymie efforts at reasonable control measures. The political policy issues involved
in the takings doctrine appear to be overshadowing even the legal issues, and it seems
that the prediction that "hard cases make bad law" has come true. 223

222Morgan, supra note 165, 7.
223Kelly, Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan: Respecting Expectations, 46 LAND USE L. & ZONING
DIG. 5 (February 1994).
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III - MANAGEMENT WITHOUT TAKING

A. The Realm of Politics
A great deal of the debate amongst scholars and members of the judiciary seems
to have been predicated on the theory that the controversy over takings and property
rights is an intellectual exercise among disinterested and impartial parties . As the
discussions of the takings doctrine in the previous section demonstrated, this is hardly
the case . Any person's opinions on such a subject must be colored by their
underlying beliefs about the issues involved, and not even Supreme Court Justices are
immune to the vagaries of human nature . In a particularly insightful commentary on
this aspect of the takings issue, Professor Gregory S. Alexander summarized the
situation by saying:
"Takings doctrine is generated not by any abstract
methodological or theoretical concern, but by the pictures that
judges have in their heads about the participants in the public landuse planning arena, pictures about who is empowered , who is
unempowered and how those who enjoy a power monopoly have
used that power to their strategic advantage. "224

Even a cursory review of the language in the takings cases which have been discussed
demonstrates the validity of this point.
In the Court's Nollan decision, Justice Scalia described a sly and manipulative
state government engaged in creating legal fictions to deprive the helpless landowners

224Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1753 (1988).
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of their property through a plan of extortion. 225 The dissenting opinion from Justice
Brennan showed an entirely different picture, one in which the government acted in
good faith only to be sandbagged by the sneaky Nollans, whom he described as
"interlopers, "2 26 and their pack of clever lawyers. The language of the Lucas
decision was even more vivid, with Justice Scalia accusing the state of "plundering
landowners generally'?" and Justice Blackmun implying that David Lucas's real
motivations involved political activism and monetary gain rather than the desire to
build houses . 228 The Dolan Court showed the same dichotomy, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist invoking the specter of an oppressive government which used the police
power "'as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular moment the
landowner [asked] the city for some license or permit.' "229 On the other hand was
Justice Stevens, describing the city of Tigard's land dedication requirements as
"rational, impartial, and conducive to fulfilling the aims of a valid land-use plan'?"
while hinting that Dolan was engaged in a calculating and self-serving attempt to

225Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141,3143-3151 passim .
226Ibid., 3154.
227Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 , 2899.
228Ibid., 2908 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting). Justice Blackmun pointed out that "petitioner
made no allegations that he had any definite plans for using his property. At trial, Lucas testified
that . . . he was 'in no hurry ' to build [his house] ' because the lot was appreciating in value.'''
Ibid. Justice Blackmun seemed to feel that Lucas was, in essence, asking the government to cover
his losses resulting from a bit of poorly-judged land speculation.
229Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309 , 2319, quoting Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 245 (1980).
230Ibid., 2329 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
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thwart reasonable municipal planning in the pursuit of a profit. 231
An observer with any degree of impartiality would undoubtedly see the true
situation as somewhere between the extreme visions set forth by these opposing
factions. Neither governments nor private landowners are the absolute saints or
conniving sinners described in these parables of power, but there is indisputably some
degree of self-interest motivating the actions of each of the players in the takings
game. There is also little doubt that this self-interest is tempered by political
philosophy, and David Lucas served as a prime example of the takings actor as a
political animal.
Whatever his motives for filing suit in 1988, it was clear by 1992 that Lucas
viewed his case as not just a legal, but also an ideological challenge to the
environmental concerns that had prompted passage of the Beachfront Management
Act. The week that the Supreme Court heard arguments in his case, Lucas indulged
in a bit of hyperbole and stated that he hoped the forthcoming decision would be "the
end of the wild-eyed tree huggers. 11232 Nor was Lucas the only one to view his case
as a turning point in a struggle of conflicting land ethics. Senator John Chafee of
Rhode Island was quoted as calling the case lithe scariest thing coming down the pike
for anyone who cares about the environment. 11233
In the democracy of modern America, it is not considered surprising or even

231Ibid., 2326 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
232Kaplan and Cohn, supra note 1, 70.
233 Ibid.
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particularly unethical for private citizens to manipulate the system of government in
order to press their own advantage, even at the expense of some other societal good.
It has long been recognized that "there is little evidence in the history of land

development in America that the private decision-maker , left to his own devices, can
be trusted to act in the public interest. "234 It is ostensibly the government's job to
ensure that the public interest is nonetheless served, and so the judiciary becomes the
arbitrator of the dispute between the public and private sectors .
It is all the more important, then, that judges avoid the pitfalls of political interests
to the greatest extent possible. Recognizing that Supreme Court Justices are only
human and that there will therefore be an inevitable overlap between professional
decisions and private judgements, there is a danger that in regard to the takings issue,
judicial partisanship has, to steal a phrase from the Court itself, gone too far. 235
The dissenting opinions in both the Lucas and Dolan cases make it clear that some
members of the Supreme Court have recognized the increasingly political nature of
takings litigation. In Lucas, Justice Blackmun raised the concern that the Court's
desire to make a statement regarding the takings doctrine led the majority to
compromise judicial standards.l" Nor is this view limited to the dissenting

234BABCOCK, supra note 18, 185.
23SThe current dispute over regulatory takings has its roots in the Supreme Court's statement in
the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that, "if regulation goes too far, it will be
recognized as a taking." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 , 2893, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U. S. 393,415 (1922).

236Ibid., 2907-2908. He comments: "Clearly, the Court was eager to decide this case. But
eagerness, in the absence of prior jurisdiction, must--and in this case should ~ave been--met with
restraint." Ibid., 2909 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting). More pointedly, he hints that the Court
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Justices. Richard J. Lazarus, who represented the South Carolina Coastal Council
before the Supreme Court, insisted that the case was heard by the Court not for its
merits but in order for the Reagan-Bush appointed conservative justices to signal a
doctrinal shift to the lower courts.F'
One of the frequent commentators on the takings issue has summarized the current
situation by saying that "the regulatory takings debate is not really about property
rights, . . . it is, more fundamentally, an institutional debate as to which branch of
government should have the final say on the substantive issues of land-use
regulation. "238 Justice Blackmun recognized the existence of this debate when he
said in his Lucas dissent, that "there is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges
long dead, "239 and asked "if judges in the 18th and 19th centuries can distinguish a
harm from a benefit, why not judges in the 20th century, and if judges can, why not
legislators? "240
This shift of power from the legislative branch of government to the judiciary may
well be the most important and disturbing aspect of the trend of the takings doctrine
over the past decade. Although he was speaking of a somewhat different topic, the
words of one-time Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork are uncannily applicable to
chose to hear an unsuitable case merely because the majority felt that the facts would produce a
pre-determined and desired result: "The Court's willingness to dispense with precedent in its haste
to reach a result is not limited to its initial jurisdictional decision." Ibid.
237Lazarus, supra note 133, 1413.
238Humbach, supra note 115,27.

239Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2914 (Justice Blackmun, dissenting).
240

Ibid.
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the current situation:
"With each successive case, the Court shrinks the sphere of
legislative decision making and expands the role of the judiciary .
. This means that we are increasingly governed not by law or
elected representatives but by an unelected, unrepresentative,
unaccountable committee . . . applying no will but their own. "241

Resolution of such a fundamental conflict between two sections of the government
will not be easily or quickly achieved, and it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
become an apolitical body in the conceivable future. In the meantime, planners and
managers must find methods to continue their endeavors, and coastal managers are no
different from other land-use regulatory personnel in this respect.

B. Coastal Management Within the Realm of Politics
After much debate and analysis of what the Supreme Court really said and what
the Supreme Court really meant about regulatory takings, the planning environment is
still one of uncertainty. It seems that just as land-use managers get a handle on the
latest twist to the takings doctrine, a new circumstance arises and a new takings test is
born. Nevertheless, and despite the Court's disparaging reference to the "so-called
'coastal zone"'242 in Lucas, management of coastal resources must continue. It is
inevitable that this management will involve the regulation of land uses, at least to
some extent.

24lHatch, Book Review, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1338, 1344-1345 (1990) (reviewing R. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989),
quoting at 130).

242Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889.
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The question which remains to be answered, then, is how best to apply land-use
regulations in order to effectively protect both private and public interests while
avoiding conflict with the doctrine of regulatory takings. There are no new and
innovative techniques of land management available which will miraculously escape
the threat of takings challenges. In fact, it seems likely that any attempt to use such
techniques would immediately draw fire from property-first proponents. The
challenge for coastal managers will be to utilize existing and proven methods to obtain
the desired results. Several techniques of flexible zoning may prove to be useful tools
in this endeavor.

1. Transfer of Development Rights and Existing- Use Zoning
The transfer of development rights (TDR) method of flexible zoning can be used
to preserve areas of critical interest or value by removing the right to develop the
property. Owners of property in the area to be preserved (the sending area) can sell
their development rights to owners of property in areas where increased construction
will have less of an adverse impact (the receiving area). In order for this scheme to
work, the TDR must be implemented through local zoning regulations, and a rather
unique set of circumstances must exist. The property owners in the receiving area
must see some profit in developing their land beyond the limits allowed by current
zoning (ie. they must want to increase density of development, height, etc.), and the
property owners in the receiving area must be unwilling or unable to use their
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development rights on their own property. 243
The need for managers to exploit or create this set of circumstances in order to
use TDRs will limit the utility of this technique, and there has been some speculation
that the essential nexus test of Nollan may preclude the use of TDRs altogether.P"
This may not necessarily be a valid concern since the essential nexus test pertained to
permit conditions imposed on property owners engaged in development, and not
directly to the structure of zoning ordinances governing that development. The
method may be of use in cases similar to Lucas, in which the goal is to prevent
development or redevelopment of a sensitive area. The Supreme Court has made it
clear that a complete ban on construction in such areas will probably amount to a
taking of property which must be compensated. The use of TDRs could help direct
construction away from the most sensitive areas, and allowing property owners who
are barred or discouraged from construction to sell their development rights elsewhere
may help to offset the government's costs in such matters, even if it does not
altogether avoid the takings issue. 245
The technique of existing use zoning may also have some limited applications in
the coastal zone. It will not solve problems of access and use like those in Nollan, or

243pLATT, supra note 4, 234-237 passim.
244Humbach, supra note 8, 352. This author contends that TDRs "came under a major
constitutional cloud" in Nollan since "the essential nexus" will always be lacking. Id.
24SPLA TT, supra note 4, 236; noting that the Supreme Court decision in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York (98 S. Ct. 2646, 1978) mentioned that: "it is not literally
accurate to say that they have been denied all use of those pre-existing [development rights]. ..
they are made transferrable ... [and] nevertheless mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has
imposed ..."
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be of much use in already-developed areas like the subdivision in Lucas, but it may
help the forward-looking planner to avoid the types of problems faced in those
instances. Existing use zoning is basically a set of regulations which provide that
"within the existing-use zone, the lawful uses of each piece of land are the uses for
which the parcel already is reasonably adapted. "246 It is up to coastal managers to
identify those areas where this type of zoning could prevent detrimental uses in the
future.?" and to take action to implement the required regulations.
The ease with which these types of zoning methods can effectively accomplish
coastal management objectives will depend greatly on the nature of the land in
question. If the area to be managed consists of largely undeveloped property, the
coastal manager may find their task relatively easy. Environmental restrictions and
new zoning regulations in such areas, especially those which are not currently
attractive to developers, may meet little resistance. However, in areas where existing
developments have created "reasonable, 'investment-backed, expectation[s],' that vest
the rights of the owner to make reasonable use of the property in accordance with
current zoning regulations, "248 the coastal manager must tread carefully.

2. "Thoughtful" Planning and Regulation
Unfortunately for the coastal manager, it is not always possible to confine

246Humbach, supra note 8, 349
247These areas have been described as "relatively undisturbed locales where the normal
presumption runs against active modifications of land use anyway." Ibid.
248KeIly, supra note 223, 6.
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regulatory efforts to undeveloped or uncontested areas. Coastal management is not
just about preservation, it is about managing the multiple uses of property and other
resources in the coastal zone. In order to be effective in the current regulatory
takings environment, land-use planners would be well advised to heed the words of
the property rights advocate who called for more "thoughtful "249 planning . Before
implementing new policies, or even implementing old ones which are similar to the
procedures followed by the city of Tigard in Dolan, managers need to stop and think
of the possible consequences.
It is easy to know where to begin this analysis, but it will become steadily more
complex as it progresses. Managers can start with question: does my proposed
action involve any degree of physical occupation of someone 's property? If the
answer is yes, the action constitutes a taking and some form of compensation must be
provided for. If the answer is no, then the next question should be: will my
proposed action deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use of their
property? This question may not be so easily answered given the current uncertainty
regarding the unit of property to be considered.P? but the coastal manager should
analyze the possibility that the claim of deprivation of use may be made . If it seems
likely that all use will be denied , the manager must look for a "background principle
of nuisance and property law'?" to justify the prohibition on the owner's use of

249Berger, supra note 200, 4.
250See, for example: Kadlecek, supra note 119, 432-434; and Berger, supra note 200, 5.
25lLucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-2902.
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their property. This may be extremely difficult to do, so it is likely that this type of
regulation will result in a compensable taking of property.
On the other hand, if the owner still has some economic use of their property, and
the proposed action will merely restrict that use, the takings analysis grows even more
subjective and complicated . If the action being proposed involves some sort of
development permit restriction or exaction, both common management tools, then the
Nollan and Dolan tests come into play. It is up to the regulator to demonstrate an

essential nexus between the restriction on the property owner and the purpose it is
intended to serve. The thoughtful planner should establish this nexus outright,
through methods such as articulation in a comprehensive land-use plan, even if the
nexus appears to be obvious and well-recognized.i? It seems clear that even the
appearance of arbitrary and unfair government requirements will invite close scrutiny
from the current Supreme Court, so prudent coastal managers should be prepared to
thoroughly defend the reasonableness of their requirements.
Effective means for dealing with the Dolan rough proportionality test are equally
elusive. Since the Court chose not to provide a precise methodology for satisfying
this requirement, coastal managers will have to attempt to err on the side of being
overly quantitative in their analyses of the relation between the mitigating effects of
an exaction and the effects of the owner's property use. Thorough studies of the
economic impact of a proposed development appear to be called for, including the
costs of the studies themselves and any closely-related benefits to be derived from

2S2Morgan, supra note 165, 7.
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governmental restrictions on the development. A popular suggestion for dealing with

Dolan has been to anticipate the public costs of private development, and to account
for these future costs through the well-established procedures for levying impact
fees. 253
It is more important than ever for land-use managers to look closely at the

implications of their actions before jumping into regulatory schemes. This is
especially true of coastal managers who deal with a fragile and volatile environment
where the need for changes in policy often seems urgent. The South Carolina
experience with Lucas is an example of what may happen when coastal managers lose
sight of the influence of the property rights movement. The Beachfront Management
Act was an outstanding law from an environmental conservation standpoint, one that
dealt aggressively with a pressing problem. It failed to account for social and
political realities, however, and as one land-use planner put it: "[this] unfortunate and
unreasonable decision to bar the construction of homes on two existing lots along a
developed road in a developed subdivision gave the country a miserable
precedent. "254 Land-use managers must try to avoid exploring the outer envelope of
the takings doctrine through litigation, a practice which, considering the current trends
from the Supreme Court, has been like playing Russian roulette with the future of
takings jurisprudence. "It is time for planners to stop creating cases that lead to

2531bid., 7-8. Impact fees are collected in order to allow the government to offset the negative
influences of new development. Cash fees are used to provide the necessary infrastructure for
growth in an area, and real-estate (land dedications) are another form of impact fee payment. See
also, Kelly, supra note 173, 8-9.

254Kelly, supra note 223, 7.
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predictably bad decisions, "255 especially since it is the planners who must then work
within the confines of those decisions.
There is another avenue of response to the Nollan, Lucas, Dolan trend of takings
jurisprudence which may be as dangerous to environmental efforts as more bad
decisions, the practice of initiating takings legislation. Takings legislation is basically
an effort to head off takings claims by requiring that the government either 1) avoid
making laws that might result in takings claims, or 2) pay owners a percentage of
their property value based on a determination of the impact of a regulation, regardless
of whether or not a regulatory taking actually occurred.i" These attempts to keep
the takings issue out of the courts are most likely to result in costly bureaucracy and
an overall "chilling effect on land-use planning and regulation. "257
While a great deal of the push for takings legislation has been in the states ,258
there has been a significant effort to enact federal statutes as well. Current
congressional efforts in this area have been labelled the "Unholy Trinity" by
environmental organizations because of their three-part agenda to: require payment of
compensation when environmental laws take away property interests; require risk
assessment and cost-benefit analyses for new environmental rules; and do away with

255

Ibid.

256Freilich and Doyle, Taking Legislation: Misguided and Dangerous, 46 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG. 3 (October 1994).
257Ibid.

258As the 1994 legislative session drew to a close, ten states had enacted takings legislation and
such legislation had been considered by all 50 states. Ibid., 3-5.

84

federal environmental mandates which are not accompanied by adequate funding. 259
The Congress seems to be adopting a strategy of avoiding the takings issue by utterly
freezing environmental regulation efforts, and this strategy is not a sound one. The
marked improvements in air and water quality in the past 30 years and the current
safeguards enjoyed by society with regard to harmful land uses appear to have blinded
some legislators to the dangers of imprudent development. The pro-property rights
members of Congress who plan to "rein in government excesses'<" in the
environmental arena, should remember that "reform and progress were the result, not
of enlightened foresight, but of bitter hindsight. "261

2S9Graham, supra note 35, 7.
260USA Today, 21 November 1994, at A4.
26IPLATT, supra note 4, 51.
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IV - CONCLUSIONS

The current property rights movement in this country is gathering strength and
garnering support from the judiciary as the end of the twentieth century approaches.
Ironically, this movement is part of a backlash against environmental activism and
regulation that has been fueled, at least in part, by the success of previous
conservation and clean-up efforts. Only in a society in which catastrophic pollution is
relatively rare would anyone suggest that the environmental movement must focus on
"explaining ... why clean air, clean water is good. "262 The lack of such benefits
makes the advantages of possessing them self-evident.
Unfortunately, the land-use management efforts which most often come under
attack through property rights takings challenges are designed to provide benefits
which are not as clear-cut as fresh air or drinkable water. These efforts typically
involve measures designed to protect resources from dangers that have only recently
been recognized and which are still discounted by many. Law professor John A.
Humbach expressed this eloquently when he wrote:
"A major factor in the current "property rights" debate is many
people's honest belief that there is no real social harm in doing such
things as destroying wetlands, exterminating entire species, or
wrecking our nation's cultural legacy. Not so long ago, after all,
wetlands were just swamps, wildlife was mainly an annoyance, and
old buildings were merely in the way." 263

262USA Today, 21 November 1994, at A4.
263Humbach, supra note 115, 7.
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The origins of the property rights movement are complex, and the socio-political
atmosphere of the 1990's seems to offer a broad base of support for this cause. In
the current uncertain economic climate, a growing number of people are unhappy to
find any hint of government waste or frivolous spending. Nature has only added to
the troubles with a series of destructive hurricanes and the severe flooding
experienced in both 1993 and 1994, costing millions of dollars for the U. S.
taxpayers.
It is important for coastal management personnel to be aware of these political

undercurrents, because the business of land-use planning is inherently a political one.
Environmental regulations cannot be created or implemented in an idealistic vacuum
with the expectation that no challenges will arise. The Supreme Court's takings
analysis in the cases of Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan has made it clear that the property
rights movement will continue to receive judicial support for their efforts in the
future. The range of regulatory action which can be defeated by a takings challenge
has been significantly broadened since 1987. In Nollan and Dolan, the use of
development permit conditions to further land-use planning objectives came under
scrutiny, and the result was a more restrictive set of criteria for designing such
conditions. The Lucas decision resulted in a new categorical takings test, (the loss of
all economically viable use of property), which may yet lead to an increase in
successful takings claims, especially if the definition of property continues to narrow.
Perhaps more importantly, this decision halted the evolution of the common law of
nuisance by sharply reducing legislative power to determine whether new or
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previously innocuous-seeming uses now constitute a noxious use of property. It
appears likely that the Supreme Court will continue to this trend of restricting the
regulation of private property uses. The Republican majority in Congress seems
intent on pursuing takings legislation, a potentially more pressing and serious threat to
environmentally friendly management efforts.
This somewhat gloomy summation of the current state of the takings doctrine does
not spell the end of the environmental movement, or of coastal management efforts.
The economic and political influences at work in the nation could ultimately prove
beneficial if the pro-environmental regulation faction takes the initiative and engages
in some thoughtful planning. In fact, public opinion has already begun to reflect
displeasure with government spending in areas like the National Flood Insurance
Program, a program that has been criticized for encouraging overdevelopment in
floodplains and coastal areas.
One recent article described in detail the problems of multiple loss incidents and
funding deficits plaguing the program and quoted Representative Joe Kennedy as
calling NFIP an entitlement program for some of the wealthiest homeowners in
America.P" It is undeniable that waterfront homeowners, especially those who are
also land developers, are numbered among the wealthy segment of society. As a
growing number of middle- and even upper-class Americans circle their figurative
wagons and prepare to defend their slice of the American pie, the wise coastal
manager may want to emphasize the financial benefits provided (or losses avoided) by

264Turque, McCormick, and Glick, On the Disaster Do/e, NEWSWEEK 24 (2 August 1993).
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land-use regulation.
Even more important than influencing public opinion through political means, the
coastal manager must concentrate on ensuring that regulatory efforts are plausible . It
is fruitless to ignore the current Supreme Court's apparent hostility toward
environmental land-use regulation. Nor is it likely that the property rights movement
will halt their efforts in the courts 265 or in Congress to limit environmental
initiatives. It is vital that coastal management personnel be aware of the current
status of the takings doctrine, and that they strive to conform to the guidelines which
have been established. A realistic view of the limitations of regulatory efforts is
critical to successful planning, but this should not prevent the development of
genuinely productive management initiatives . If the current legal trends continue, the
property rights movement will probably continue to expand to the limits of the
taxpayers financial endurance. When the fiscal constraints of local governments begin
to preclude environmentally friendly regulation, the American people will have to
decide whether it is the private landowner's rights which are more important, or those
of the public.

265Their commitment to establishing further limits on regulatory efforts was made evident in
the most recent book from Professor Epstein in which he encouraged greater activism and lamented
that the opportunity for curtailment of such efforts presented by Nollan and First English had been
"frittered away." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 195 (1993).
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